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PROTECTION FOR THE HARD OF HEARING:
STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF
HEARING AID DEALERS
Howard W. Brill*
Nearly three million Americans have come to rely on hearing
aids for assistance with their hearing problems. In this Article,
Professor Brill compares the forty-five state laws and the new fed-
eral guidelines which regulate the hearing aid industry in an at-
tempt to determine which state regulations are most effective in
meeting the desired goal of protecting the hard of hearing.
Fifteen million Americans are handicapped by hearing losses.1
Since the development of the first wearable electronic hearing aids in
the mid-1930's, 2 three million individuals have come to rely on the
hearing aid for assistance with their handicap. Each year 15,000 deal-
ers distribute 600,000 hearing aids to the public.3  Because of a con-
cern that many individuals were purchasing aids which were either
unnecessary or of negligible assistance, or that persons were being
taken advantage of by unqualified or unscrupulous dealers, state
legislatures have enacted statutes designed to provide some protec-
tion for those handicapped citizens. 4 The first statute 5 was enacted
by Oregon in 1959. Similar statutes were passed by forty-four other
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. B.A. Duke University; J.D. Univer-
sity of Florida.
1. STAFF STUDY, STATE LICENSING LAWS AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR HEARING
AID DEALERS, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERN-
MENT OPERATIONS, United States Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
STAFF STUDY].
2. L. WATSON & T. TOLAN, HEARING TESTS AND HEARING INSTRUMENTS 270-83 (1949).
For an illustrated history of the hearing atid covering 25 centuries and including Holmes,
Beethoven, Alexander Graham Bell (in some ways the father of the modern hearing aid) and
discussing carbon, vacuum and transistor aids, see BERGER, THE HEARING AID 7-81 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as BERGER].
3. STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 1; Hearing Aid Industry, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE
ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, United States Senate, 14th
Cong., 2d Sess. 152-153 (1976) [hereinafter cited as INVESTIGATIONS]. Those figures, which
are only rough estimates, vary according to the source. It also has been estimated that perhaps
75% of the hearing aids dispensed are distributed by 15% of the dealers, and that 80% of the
hard of hearing persons could be helped with hearing aids. Id. at 85.
4. For a detailed discussion of the abuses involved in the selling and dispensing of hearing
aids, see HEARING AIDS AND THE OLDER AMERICAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER INTER-
ESTS OF THE ELDERLY, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., Ist
Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as ELDERLY].
5. The hearing aid licensing approach first was proposed in 1941. For a brief history of the
various proposals, see BERGER, supra note 2, at 130-33.
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states between 1966 and 1976.6 Building on the state statutes, the
Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration
have proposed federal action in this area. 7
6. The statutes, in order of original enactment, are:
1959: OR. REV. STAT. § 694.015-991 (1975).
1966: MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1451-.1466 (1976).
1967: FLA. STAT. ANN. 9 468.120-.138 (West 1977).
IND. CODE ANN. 9 25-20-1-1 to 24. (Burns 1974) (amended 1976).
TENN. CODE ANN. 9 63-1501 to 1521 (1976).
1968: KAN. STAT. ANN. 9 74-5801 to 5824 (1972) (amended 1976).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2441-:2465 (West 1974).
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 36-24-1 to 43 (1972) (amended 1976).
1969: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1701 to 1717 (Supp. 1975).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, 99 737-754A (1971) (amended 1976).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-3003 to 3022 (Supp. 1975).
NEB. REV. STAT. 9 71-4701 to 4719 (1976).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-36-1 to 18 (1974).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93D-1 to 16 (Supp. 1975).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-33-01 to 19 (Supp. 1977).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4747.01-99 (Page 1977).
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 4566-1.01 to 1.22 (Vernon 1976).
WISC. STAT. ANN. 9 459.01-.14 (West 1974) (amended 1976).
1970: ARiz. REV. STAT. § 36-1901 to 1938 (1974).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 3300-3456 (West 1974).
GA. CODE ANN. § 84-5601 to 5620 (1975).
VA. CODE § 54-524.110-.116 (1976).
1971: ALA. CODE, tit. 46, § 150(21)-(39) (Supp. 1974).
IDAHO CODE § 54-2901 to 2919 (Supp. 1977).
S.C. CODE § 40-25-10 to 190 (1977).
1972: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-396 to 407 (West Supp. 1976).
KY. REV. STAT. § 334.010-.990 (Supp. 1976).
MISS. CODE ANN. 9 73-14-1 to -47 (Supp. 1977).
1973: DEL. CODE tit. 16, §§ 2001-2020 (1975) (amended 1976).
MINN. STAT. ANN. 9 145.43-.45 (West Supp. 1976).
Mo. REV. STAT. 9 346.010-.135 (Vernon Supp. 1976).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 637A.010-.360 (1975).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9A-1 to-28 (West Supp. 1977).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1551-1569 (West Supp. 1976).
R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-49-1 to 20 (1976).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.35.010-900 (Supp. 1977).
W. VA. CODE § 16-24-1 to 20 (Supp. 1976).
1974: HAW. REv. STAT. § 451A-1 to 19 (Supp. 1975).
IOWA CODE ANN. 9 154A.1-.27 (West Supp. 1977).
1975: COLO. REV. STAT. 9 12-65-101 to 121 (Supp. 1976).
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, §§ 1658 to 1660-F (Supp. 1976).
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 780-787 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, §§ 4581-4586 (Supp. 1977).
1976: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 6700-101 to 802 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
1977: WYO. SESS. LAWS Ch. 163 (1977).
(N.H.) CCH MED. DEVICES. REP. 17,220 (statute enacted Nov. 1977).
Four state legislatures have not acted in this area: Alaska, Illinois, Massachusetts and Utah.
7. Proposed Federal Trade Commission Rules for the Hearing Aid Industry, 40 Fed. Reg.
26,646 (1975); Food and Drug Administration Regulation for Hearing Aid Devices, 42 Fed. Reg.
HEARING AID REGULATION
The statutes that have been enacted by the state legislatures to
control hearing aid dealers fall into three categories. The most com-
mon type of statute enacted during the 1960's follows the standard
approach to a regulated industry or occupation. It creates a board of
hearing aid dealers or fitters which is given the power to license indi-
viduals. Licenses are granted following successful completion of an
examination. The statute may place limited controls upon the opera-
tions and business practices of those licensed hearing aid dealers. The
second type of statute, which has been followed in perhaps ten of the
forty-five states, goes much further in controlling the business prac-
tices of the dealers. This type of statute commonly includes provisions
for practical tests and written examinations, restrictions on advertising
and pricing practices, requirements for continuing education, controls
on the relationship between dealers and medical personnel, a statu-
tory right of rescission, and injunctive powers for the enforcing au-
thority. The third type of statute, adopted by three jurisdictions dur-
ing the mid-1970's, omits the board approach to licensing and instead
deals directly with what the legislature has felt to be the underlying
cause of consumer complaints. Such a statute simply bars any indi-
vidual from selling, dispensing or fitting any hearing aids without a
written recommendation from a physician. This Article will compare
the state statutes in an attempt to determine which have been the
most effective in protecting individuals who are hard of hearing.8
COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD OF HEARING AID DEALERS
Of the forty-five states that have enacted legislation regulating the
hearing aid industry, forty-two have created a board of hearing aid
dealers. 9  The board is typically comprised of five' 0 or seven" indi-
9,286 (1977). See also Hearing Aid Industry Rules, 16 C.F.R. § 214 (1977); Medical Device
Amendments Law of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, which gives the FDA authority to require that
medical devices be safe and effective before they reach the marketplace depending on the
potential risk to the consumer. For a brief history of federal activity, see BERGER, supra note 2,
at 133-34.
8. This Article will not deal with the problems of those individuals whose hearing is so
impaired that they may be described as deaf. See generally L. MYERS, THE LAW AND THE
DEAF (1964). This Article will not focus on the problems of noise in society. See generally NOISE
POLLUTION AND THE LAW (J. Hildebrand, ed. 1970); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§
4901-4918 (1973).
9. Minnesota, New York and Vermont have not created a licensing board.
10. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-14-9 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4747.03
(Page Supp. 1975).
11. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 451A-3 (Supp. 1975); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
338.1454 (1976). However, the size of the state boards can vary from three members in Nevada,
NEV. REV. STAT. § 637A.040 (1975), to nine members in Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. § 334.140
(Supp. 1976).
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viduals who are appointed by the governor with the advice and con-
sent of the state senate.12 Only in Tennessee13 are all members of
the board licensed hearing aid dealers. In the other jurisdictions, the
statutes require a diversity of individuals on the board. The most
common approach 14 is to require perhaps three or five dealers, one
audiologist 15 and one otolaryngologist' 6 on the Board. The statutes
commonly give the voluntary professional organizations of hearing aid
dealers within the state the power to make recommendations to the
governor. 17 Some states require that the dealers appointed to the
board be connected with a national hearing aid organization 18 or be
actually certified by the National Hearing Aid Society.' 9 In light of
the apparent ease with which certification by the National Hearing
Aid Society. is granted, 20 it is questionable whether this membership
is helpful or necessary. All three regulatory approaches permit out-
12. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 750(2) (1971). Contra, ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-1902
(1971) (authorizing Director of the Department of Health Services to make the appointments).
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1501 (1976). The Louisiana Board consists of seven dealers and
the State Health Officer. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2455 (West 1974).
14. Missouri may typify the most common approach. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 346.120 (Ver-
non Supp. 1976).
15. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-49-15 (1976). An audiologist is an "individual whose
primary interest is in the identification and measurement of hearing loss and the rehabilitation
of those with hearing impairments." NEWBY, AUDIOLOGY 1 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
NEWBY]. The profession of audiology resulted from a combination, during World War II, of
otology and speech pathology. Many audiologists have master's degrees in audiology or a related
field and have been certified as clinically competent by the American Speech and Hearing
Association. Id. at 376-92. See the definition of audiologist at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4581
(Supp. 1977). For an example of a state statute regulating audiologists, see ARK. STAT. ANN. §
72-1801 (Supp. 1975).
16. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9A-3 (West Supp. 1977). An otolaryngologist is a physi-
cian who specializes in disorders of the ear, nose and throat. An otologist is a physician who
specializes in disorders of the ear only. L. BolEs, J. HILGER & R. PRIEST, FUNDAMENTALS OF
OTOLARYNGOLOCY 1 (4th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as BOlES]. There are approximately 2,000
audiologists and 7,000 otolaryngologists in the country. ELDERLY, supra note 4, at 307, 326.
17. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-397 (West Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. §
84-5613 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 154A.2 (West Supp. 1977). See also S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 36-24-3 (1972), which automatically makes the President of the Hearing Aid Dealers
Association of South Dakota a member of the state board.
18. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5802 (1972) (amended 1976).
19. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45-9A-3 (West Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §
36-24-3 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1501 (1976). The National Hearing Aid Society is a trade
association of approximately 2200 hearing aid dealers who become "Certified Hearing Aid Au-
diologists" by taking a 20-lesson home study course and an examination. In addition to propos-
ing a model licensing statute in the mid 1960's, it has been active in continuing education,
ethical issues and consumer relations within the industry. INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 3, at
135-68. For a brief history of the NHAS, see BERGER, supra note 2, at 122-24.
20. STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 3-6. See How to Buy a Hearing Aid, CONSUMER RE-
PORTS 346, 350 (June 1976).
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side organizations to have some control, and occasionally significant
control, over who is a member of the state licensing board.
In addition to political 2' and geographical 2 2 limitations on the
composition of the board, the statutes frequently limit Board connec-
tions with hearing aid manufacturers. For example, Nevada forbids
members of the board from holding stock in a corporation which
manufactures hearing aids. 23 In order to insure that the board is free
from competitive control, some states require that no more than two
dealers be connected with the same hearing aid manufacturer.24
However, some states have structured their statutes so as to deal
with a variety of problems and interests unique to the hearing aid
industry. Several states specifically provide that the director of the
state board of health or representatives of other state agencies be on
the board.2 5  In addition to the dispensers and the audiologists, 26
some state boards also are comprised of individuals who have no con-
nection with the hearing aid industry. These independent members
are placed on the board as representatives of the public. 27 For in-
stance, Colorado provides that four members of the seven-member
board be individuals who are not licensed by or employed in any
health care occupation.28 Since 1973, South Dakota has required one
board member to be a lay person, and, if possible, a user of the
services. 29 This requirement is based on the view that a user can
provide the board with a more intimate knowledge of the needs of
hearing aid consumers. Conversely, Rhode Island provides that the
board shall include one lay member who is unconnected with hearing
aids, audiologists, or state agencies.30 The language of the statute
21. See DEL. CODE, tit. 16, § 2014 (1975).
22. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.124 (West Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
37:2455 (West 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1501 (1976) (one member "from each grand divi-
sion of the state").
23. NEV. REV. STAT. § 637A.050 (1975).
24. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-20-1-7 (Burns 1974); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4566-1.02
(Vernon 1976).
25. Ky. REV. STAT. § 334.140 (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE § 40-25-40.(1977).
26. The antagonism between dealers and audiologists is revealed in The Evolving Hearing
Aid Dispensing System, HEARING INSTRUMENTS 22 (December 1976) (interview with National
Hearing Aid Society attorney). Compare ELDERLY, supra note 4, at 35-39. See also TENN.
CODE ANN. § 63-1723 (1976), which creates a type of interlocking agency by requiring that a
hearing aid dealer be included on the regulatory board of audiologists.
27. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1902(A)(1) (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-397(b)
(West Supp. 1977). A model bill proposed by an association of senior citizens urged the inclu-
sion of more consumers on regulatory boards. ELDERLY, supra note 4, at 19.
28. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-65-102(2) (Supp. 1976).
29. S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 36-24-4.1 (Supp. 1976).
30. R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-49-15 (1976).
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suggests that Rhode Island would exclude from membership on the
board any hearing aid user, certainly a questionable policy. Maine
provides that one member of the State Committee on Aging shall be
on the board of hearing aid dealers. 31  Mississippi provides that one
person shall be recommended by the Mississippi School for the
Deaf.32 Particularly in light of evidence that dealers have frequently
dominated the boards, 33 the traditional makeup of the boards could
be altered so that the hard of hearing have more impact on the opera-
tion and enforcement of the hearing aid statutes. This goal could be
accomplished by placing more non-dealers on the board.
The members of the board usually are appointed for a four-year
term.3 4  Most statutes provide that members of the board are enti-
tled to reimbursements for expenses, but otherwise serve without
compensation.3 5 A minority of boards do permit compensation,
ranging from a fee of fifteen to twenty dollars a day with an annual
total not exceeding five hundred to one thousand dollars. 36  Such
compensation limits may make it difficult to obtain qualified persons
for increasingly time-consuming positions.
Powers of the Hearing Aid Board
Approximately sixty percent of the hearing aid boards are self-gov-
erning regulatory boards. The remainder are merely advisory boards
to the state department of health or to some similar agency. How-
ever, the powers which are granted to either the hearing aid board or
to the state board of health for enforcement of the hearing aid act are
basically the same. The boards customarily are empowered to prepare
and administer examinations, to issue licenses, to suspend and revoke
licenses, to adopt regulations, to hire consultants and to take what-
ever administrative steps are necessary to carry out the act. 3 7
Many states have granted more specific powers to the boards. As a
common example, the Arkansas board is required to periodically in-
31. ME. REv. STAT. tit. 32, § 1660-A (Supp. 1976).
32. MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-14-9 (Supp. 1977).
33. STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 6-8, 27-34.
34. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93D-3(a) (1975).
35. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-36-3(F) (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-33-15(4) (Supp.
1977).
36. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1551 (West Supp. 1976).
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 2015 (1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 751 (1971). The
Kentucky Attorney General has ruled that these general powers permitted the board to appoint




spect the facilities of hearing aid dealers and to test the audiometers
used in testing hearing. 38 The Delaware hearing aid council is au-
thorized to develop standardized educational procedures, 39 and the
California board is authorized to set up an educational course for
dealers on the fitting and selection of hearing aids. 40  The Georgia
board is empowered to draft procedure and equipment requirements,
but those requirements are obviously limited because they cannot be
"in conflict with acceptable practices currently employed by the
hearing aid industry." 41 The Georgia legislature apparently is con-
tent to allow the profession to influence the regulatory board's de-
velopment of policies. The Michigan board is required to appoint an
advisory council composed of two audiologists, one physician, and one
optometrist. 42  The optometrist apparently is selected to provide in-
formation on hearing aids that are contained in eye glasses.
The state board of health generally administers the hearing aid
regulations in jurisdictions where the board of hearing aid dealers is
solely advisory and not independent. 43 However, the hearing aid act
is enforced by the Director of Consumer Affairs in New Jersey, 4 by
the Department of State in New York, 45 and by the Attorney General
in North Dakota. 46 In the State of Washington, the licensing of
hearing aid dealers for unknown reasons is administered by the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles. 47 These state agencies generally have
the same powers to implement the policies advocated by the advisory
boards as do the independent hearing aid boards. It is doubtful that
an independent hearing aid board will guarantee better implementa-
tion of the individual state's hearing aid law. A comprehensive state
board administering the act could likely apply more experience, com-
petence and diligence to the legislative grant of authority than a
board which meets infrequently, often lacks financial compensation,
may not be properly staffed, and may be subject to industry control
38. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1704() (Supp. 1975).
39. DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 2015(3) (1975). See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 1544A.4 (West Supp.
1977), which directs the board to develop exams based on those given by other states.
40. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3327 (West 1974). But see Op. TEX. ATT'y GEN. M-715
(November 2, 1970), which held that the Texas board did not have the implied authority to
conduct educational seminars related to the hearing aid industry.
41. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-5614 (1975).
42. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1455(g) (1976).
43. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.123 (West Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 16-24-4
(Stipp. 1976).
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9A-17 (West Supp. 1976).
45. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 786 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-33-01 (Supp. 1977).
47. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.35.010 (Supp. 1977).
1977]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
or institutional bias. 48 If the hearing aid board effectively advises its
parent agency, then its recommendations should have at least as
much impact on the actual enforcement of the act as if it were inde-
pendently enforcing the act.
Financing the Regulation
In fiscal 1975, the average state hearing aid board had an annual
budget of $12,500. 49  Funding for the boards, whether they were
advisory or independent regulatory agencies, is derived primarily
from fees that are paid by holders of the licenses. The initial fee for
the examination and license for the first year ranges from five dol-
lars5 0 to one hundred dollars. 5' The annual renewal license typically
costs seventy-five dollars per year.5 2 Iowa simply provides that the
annual fees shall. be set by the board and shall be based upon the cost
of operating the board and administering the act. 53
Some statutes provide that the fees collected shall go to the general
fund of the state and the board shall then be funded by legislative
appropriations. 54  In a majority of states, however, the license fees go
into a special fund to be used to pay the costs of operating the board
of hearing aid dealers. 55 Some states have provided specifically that
no general revenue funds of the state shall be applied to operate the
hearing aid board.5 6 The New Jersey statute goes so far as to say
that the expenditures of the board shall not exceed the revenues
during any fiscal year. 57  Such financial restrictions, leading to a
shortage of funds, may limit substantially the board's ability to en-
force or administer the act. It is not clear why an agency that must
regulate an industry must be expected to generate sufficient funds
48. For a discussion of the institutional bias that may exist in self regulation, see McCor-
mack, The Purpose of Due Process: Fair Hearing or Vehicle for Judicial Review? 52 TEX. L.
REV. 1257, 1262-72 (1974) [hereinafter cited as McCormack]. The bias that existed in the
Kentucky regulatory scheme is revealed in STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 6-9, 27-34.
49. STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 61.
50. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 451A-7 (Supp. 1975).
51. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 1658-H (Supp. 1976).
52. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-65-111 (Supp. 1975). The renewal rate ranges from
five dollars per year in Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 451A-8 (Supp. 1975), to one hundred
twenty five dollars per year in Washington, WASH. REV. STAT. § 18.35.090 (Supp. 1975).
53. IOWA CODE ANN. § 154A.17 (West Supp. 1977).
54. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1903 (1974).
55. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.1281 (West Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4718
(1976).
56. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1565 (West Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 16-24-3
(Supp. 1976).
57. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9A-18 (West Supp. 1976).
[Vol. 27:45
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from that industry to pay the cost of operation. Although these re-
strictive statutes certainly could be changed, their inclusion in the
general provisions suggests that the legislators did not consider the
need for hearing aid regulation great enough to justify using funds
from the general revenues.
THE LICENSING OF HEARING AID DEALERS
The statutes, after creating an administrative framework, define
"hearing aid" and related terms for the purpose of restricting those
who may engage in the practice. Those individuals who sell hearing
aids are described alternatively as hearing aid dealers, 58 dispensers, 59
specialists, 60 fitters,61 or practitioners. 62  A hearing aid usually is de-
fined as "any wearable instrument or device designed for or offered
for the purpose of aiding or compensating for impaired human hear-
ing, and any parts, attachments or accessories, including ear molds,
but excluding batteries and cords." 63  The statutes customarily in-
clude the ear mold as part of the aid, but exclude batteries and cords
which are sold over-the-counter by retail establishments throughout
the country.
The statutes then define the phrase "practice of fitting and dealing
in hearing aids" as including, but not limited to, "the selection,
adapting or sale of hearing aids or parts thereof; the testing of hearing
by means of an audiometer or equivalent measurement of hearing;
and the making of impressions for ear molds." 64  Some states have
58. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-396 (West Supp. 1976).
59. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1901 (1974).
60. NEV. REV. STAT. § 637A.020 (1975).
61. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4747.01 (Page 1977). See also Op. KY. Arr'Y GEN.
73-672 (September 25, 1973), which criticizes the imprecise language of that statute for indis-
criminately referring to "fitters," "dealers and fitters," and "dealers or fitters."
62. DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 2001 (1975).
63. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 1658 (Supp. 1976). See also the broad definitions of OR. REV.
STAT. § 694.015 (1975) ("any prosthetic instrument or device designed for or represented as
aiding, improving or correcting defective human hearing and any parts, attachments or acces-
sories of such an instrument or device") and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4581 (Supp. 1977).
Compare the more technical and limiting definition of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9A-2 (West Supp.
1977). For a more comprehensive discussion of the technology of hearing aids, see NEWBY,
supra note 15, at § 321-334; BOES, supra note 16, at § 160-166; HEARING AND DEAFNESS §
284-305 (H. DAVIS & S. SILVERMAN eds., 3rd ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]; E. CoRt-
LISS, HEARING AIDS 4-7 (1970). See generally Hearing Aids, CONSUMER REPORTS 310-20 (May
1970).
64. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 1658 (Supp. 1976). One who takes an ear impres-
sion, has an impression made, and then sells that impression as a component part of a hearing




defined the practice of fitting and dealing more broadly. For example,
Arizona regulates those who make audiograms for a physician.6 5 In
Delaware, the statute includes those who use an otoscope or ear light
to evaluate the feasibility of and use in ear molds and ear mold im-
pressions.66 Florida defines fitting or dealing in terms of advising or
assisting in the purchase of aids or adjusting aids. 67  These latter pro-
visions bring individuals under the hearing aid statutes who may not
even be engaged in the sale of aids.
The statutes, in prohibiting a non-licensed individual from selling
hearing aids, define "sale" as "any transfer of title or of the right to
use [the aid] by lease, bailment, or any other contract." 68 However,
the definition usually excludes wholesale transactions, 69 transactions
between distributors or dealers, 70 and the "temporary, charitable loan
or educational loan of a hearing aid without remuneration," 71 thus
limiting the statute basically to retail sales for profit.
Exclusions from Licensing
After initially requiring licensing of those who are involved in the
fitting and selling of hearing aids, the typical statutes proceed to
exclude a number of individuals who fall under the state's definition
of fitting and selling. All the states exclude individuals licensed under
the appropriate medical statutes. 72  In addition, some statutes also
exclude osteopaths 73 and audiologists. 74  While permitting the test-
ing of hearing, most statutes prohibit a physician or audiologist from
selling aids. 75 But some statutes are unclear as to whether the
physician is permitted to sell a hearing aid without being licensed or
whether the exclusion merely permits him to test hearing but without
selling an aid.76 The preferred reading of the statutes, as supported
by most professionals, 77 suggests that the physician should be entirely
65. Amz. REv. STAT. § 36-1901 (1974). See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 451A-1 (Supp. 1975).
66. DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 2001 (1975).
67. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.122(6)(a) (West Supp. 1977). See the unique and comprehensive
definition of "hearing aid orientation" in ME. REv. STAT., tit. 32, § 1658(6) (Supp. 1976).
68. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 54-2901 (Supp. 1977).
69. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 150(21)(G) (Supp. 1974).
70. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 451A-1 (Supp. 1975).
71. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 154A.1 (West Supp. 1977).
72. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-14-5 (Supp. 1977).
73. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §'43-33-04 (Supp. 1975).
74. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-36-7 (1974).
75. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-49-4 (1976). See also Op. Ky. Ar-r'Y GEN. § 73-826
(November 30, 1973).
76. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9A-22 (West Supp. 1977), which suggests that a physi-
cian may sell a hearing aid without being licensed.
77. See INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 3, at 4-18.
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barred from selling an aid, because the profit motive may interfere
with professional independence and judgment.
In addition, the statutes commonly exclude from licensing regula-
tions an individual who works for a charitable institution or who is
associated with an institution of higher education in a curriculum
connected with hearing. Such individuals are commonly free to fit
hearing aids provided that they do not sell them. 78 Another common
exclusion is that a corporation may sell and fit hearing aids, provided
that the corporation is properly registered and that the only individu-
als who actually fit and sell as employees of the corporation are also
properly licensed. 79
A number of states have specific provisions dealing with more un-
usual and sometimes questionable exclusions from the basic licensing
requirements. For example, Arkansas specifically excluded chiroprac-
tors from the licensing requirements,80 although the relevancy of that
occupation to hearing problems is tenuous. Rhode Island8 l permits
anyone to measure hearing, provided that they do not sell hearing
aids. This type of statute allows volunteer organizations to do basic
screen testing in the public schools. The California statute does not
regulate catalog or direct mail sales, so long as no advice is given for
fitting or selecting an aid or ear mold.8 2 Oklahoma simply permits
anyone to measure hearing and even to make and fit ear molds, pro-
vided that there is no sale of a hearing aid.8 3 The exclusions of Ar-
kansas and Oklahoma could reveal legislative surrender to vested
interests, rather than a real concern for the hearing handicapped
public, because of the substantial numbers of persons excluded from
the regulatory provisions of the statutes.
License Requirements
There are generally four requirements for a license to sell aids. The
applicant for a license is typically required to be at least either 18 or
21 years old, to have the equivalent of a high school education, to be
of good moral character, and to be free of contagious or infectious
78. See, e.g., Amz. REv. STAT. § 36-1921 (1974).
79. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-65-105 (Supp. 1976).
80. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1706(6) (Supp. 1975).
81. R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-49-4 (1976).
82. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3351.5 (West 1974). But see text accompanying notes 234-
235 infra.
83. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1557 (West Supp. 1976).
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disease. 84 The age requirement in many states is now 18,85 and the
high school education requirement frequently is eliminated for those
who have sufficient experience, at least sufficient experience before
the particular statute was enacted. 86 In defining good moral charac-
ter, Indiana denies a license to anyone previously involved in a crime
of moral turpitude. 87 In contrast, a criminal record in Oklahoma is
only evidence of a lack of good moral character. 88 Iowa unwisely
permits consideration of a past felony record only if it directly relates
to the fitting and licensing of hearing aids. 89
Some states require applicants to be residents of the state. 90 Con-
necticut requires that the applicant be a United States citizen. 91 On
the other hand, Iowa provides that one should not be ineligible be-
cause of citizenship, although information as to citizenship, age, sex,
race, and marital status may be requested. 92  Several states require
that no license be issued until the applicant is employed at an estab-
lished place of business. 93 Florida requires that if a dealer does not
have an established place of business at a permanent address open
during normal business hours, then he must be employed by an indi-
vidual meeting these requirements. 94 Such statutes make it difficult
84. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93D-5 (1975);TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4566-1.06
(Vernon 1976). As to the application for a license in general, see COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAw 484-491 (1965) [hereinafter cited as COOPER]; McCoaMACK, supra note 48, at 1272-
1278; Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
85. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 334.050(3) (Supp. 1976).
86. See, e.g., Asuz. REV. STAT. § 36-1923 (1974). As to the validity of those educational
requirements, compare STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 10 with The Adequacy of Training for
Hearing Aid Specialists, AUDECIBEL 182 (Fall 1976).
87. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-20-1-3 (Burns 1974). However, the statute still must be enforced.
The Senate committee heard of a California individual who honestly informed the board on his
application that he had been convicted of several crimes, including assault and sodomy with a
sheep, but who was still licensed by the board, despite the requirement of good moral charac-
ter.
88. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1558 (West Supp. 1976).
89. IOWA CODE ANN. § 154A.9 (West Supp. 1977).
90. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5811 (1972); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 36-24-17
(1972). See also Op. KY. ATT'Y GEN. § 73-826 (November 30, 1973), which bars a non-resident
from being licensed, or from receiving a training permit, even if sponsored by a licensed Ken-
tucky hearing aid dealer. Contra, Op. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. M-636 (May 21, 1970), basis as a
resident, whether by examination or under a grandfather clause.
91. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-400 (West Supp. 1976). But see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717 (1973).
92. IOWA CODE ANN. § 154A.9 (West Supp. 1977).
93. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1707 (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE § 16-24-5 (Supp.
1976) (applicant must intend to maintain a permanent office in the state or have a permanent
office in another state within "reasonable commuting distance"). Contra, Op. TEXAS ATr'Y GEN.
M-715 (November 2, 1970) (the Texas board may not require a business address within the
state).
94. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.126(7) (West Supp. 1976).
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for a licensed individual to start a new business. These restrictions of
residency, citizenship and office never have been subjected to con-
stitutional scrutiny, and it is questionable whether such statutory pro-
visions could withstand an attack on constitutional grounds.
The Training Period
After meeting the statutory prerequisites, the applicant generally
must seek a temporary permit describing the holder as a trainee or
apprentice. Temporary permits are customarily valid for one year or
until thirty days after the next exam. 95 To obtain a license as a tem-
porary trainee, the individual must show that he is being supervised
by a current permit holder and that the current permit holder will
give him training in the practice of fitting and dealing in hearing
aids. 96 Although the applicant must list the name of the licensee
who will be his supervisor, the statutes do not call for any specific
training. Therefore, it is conceivable that a trainee could obtain a
temporary license, wait until the next licensing exam and pass it
without any practical training in the office of a hearing aid dealer.
Several states have drafted their statutes to prevent this weakness.
North Carolina bars an individual from obtaining a permanent license
until he has had an apprentice license for at least one year.9 7 Thus,
there is a minimum training period, although there is no requirement
of any actual training during that period. Oklahoma law says in gen-
eral terms that the supervisor shall maintain adequate contact with
the trainee.9 8 Maine requires that there be at least thirty days of
actual supervision of the trainee. 99 North Dakota requires thirty
hours of textbook study and ten hours of actual training on the au-
diometer before the trainee is allowed contact with the public. Then
the trainee must spend one week in the office within a sixty day
period, during which time he is not permitted to sell a hearing aid
without the approval of the supervisor. 100
Florida and Kentucky require the most elaborate and extensive
training programs. 10 1 The training is divided into three stages,
95. See, e.g., TENN. CODE § 63-1510 (1976).
96. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-1926 (1974).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93D-5(c) (Supp. 1975).
98. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1561 (West Supp. 1976). See also WASH. REv. CODE. ANN.
§ 18.35.060 (Supp. 1977). Washington permits a dealer to supervise only three trainees at a
time.
99. ME. REv. STAT. tit. 32, § 1658-1(1) (Supp. 1976).
100. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-33-08 (Supp. 1977).
101. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.126 (West Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. § 334.090 (Supp. 1976).




which must occur consecutively. During stage one, a period of thirty
days, the trainee may not fit aids or test hearing, but may work in the
office under the direct control of the licensee. During stage two,
lasting sixty days, the trainee may test customers' hearing and make
ear mold impressions. During stage three, which lasts for ninety
days, a trainee may do everything that a licensed hearing aid dealer
may do, but any work must be done under the supervision and con-
trol of a dealer. Only after completing this one hundred eighty days
of training is the trainee qualified to take the exam and to receive his
own license. These two states have the only training program
adequately providing for both supervision and actual training.102
The Licensing Examination
After meeting the requirements of the statute and the training re-
quirements, forty-two states require the applicant to pass an exam
before being licensed.' 0 3  That exam is given on a frequency ranging
from once a year 10 4 to once every three months. 105 Other states
have more flexible standards. Nebraska says that an individual should
be able to take an exam thirty days 106 after applying for a license,
which results in a situation in which the Nebraska board may be giv-
ing the exam twelve times a year.
The statutes begin with a basic written exam, testing on subjects
including: (1) the basic physics of sound; 107 (2) the anatomy and
physiology of the ear; 108 and (3) the functions of the hearing aid. 109
In addition, nearly all the states call for practical tests of compe-
tency. 110 These commonly include questions on: (1) pure tone au-
diometry; "1 (2) air conduction testing; 112 (3) bone conduction test-
102. Unfortunately, the Kentucky statute has not been applied fairly and completely. See
STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 27-29. Pennsylvania recently has adopted a similar approach.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6700-306(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
103. From 1970 to 1974, 73% of those taking the exam nationwide passed. STAFF STUDY,
supra note 1, at 60.
104. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 154A.11 (West Supp. 1977).
105. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 25-20-1-11 (Burns 1974).
106. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4707 (1976).
107. See generally NEWBY, supra note 15, at 5-17.
108. See generally, BoiEs, supra note 16, at 5-20; D. DEWEESE & W. SAUNDERS,
TEXTBOOK ON OTOLARYNGOLOGY, 250-65 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as DEWEESE].
109. See generally DAVIS, supra note 63, at 280-317.
110. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1708 (Supp. 1975). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 84-5609
(1975).
111. Pure tone audiometry utilizes an instrument to generate electronically tones of essential
"purity," similar to those produced by a tuning fork. The audiometer then measures the
threshold level of hearing at various frequencies. Hearing loss is measured, in decibels, as the
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ing; 113 (4) masking; 114 (5) recording and evaluation of audiograms; 115
and (6) the taking of ear mold impressions. 1 16  The statutes usually
provide that the test shall not require any college training or medical
competency. 117 Some states actually provide that there shall be no
testing of audiological skills.1 18
A number of the states test on subjects other than medical and
practical areas. Arizona tests the applicant's knowledge of the hearing
aid code of ethics; 119 West Virginia tests on the dealer's knowledge of
the grounds for revocation and suspension of a license.120 Several
statutes require that the applicant be tested on his knowledge of the
medical rehabilitation facilities for hard of hearing individuals. 121  Ar-
kansas tests the live voice or recorded voice speech audiometry, in-
cluding speech reception, threshold testing, and speech discrimina-
difference between the threshold level, when the impaired ear can just barely detect the pre-
sence of the tone and zero decibels, the theoretical point at which the average normal ear can
detect the presence of the test tones 50% of the time. NEWBY, supra note 15, at 67-70. See also
DEWEESE, supra note 108, at 282-84.
112. Normally we hear by air conduction. Most sounds are air borne; the sound waves are
directed by the outer ear down the ear canal to the ear drum, relayed across the ossicular bones
of the middle ear to the fluid systems of the inner ear, and then transmitted via the VII1th
nerve to the brain. Air conduction testing determines the ability to hear in this fashion.
NEWBY, supra note 15, at 25-30, 73-81.
113. Hearing also occurs by bone conduction. Since the inner ear is encased in bone, vibra-
tion of this bone will cause the fluid of the inner ear to move, even if those vibrations have not
proceeded through the ear canal, the ear drum and the middle ear. However, hearing by bone
conduction is less efficient than by air conduction. To set the bones of the skull in movement,
vibrations must be more intense. In addition, in traveling through the head, rather than
through the canal, some sounds are not accurately transmitted. Id. at 30-31. Perhaps only 1% of
hard of hearing individuals are able to use bone conduction more satisfactorily than air conduc-
tion. DAVIS, supra note 63, at 323. If the air conduction tests disclose no hearing loss, then the
hearing examination is effectively ended. But if the air conduction test does disclose a hearing
loss, then the bone conduction test is given to determine if the loss is due to conduction or
sensori-neural factors. The bone conduction test is performed by placing a small vibrator on the
temporal bone behind the outer ear. NEWBY, supra note 15, at 82-90.
114. Masking occurs in any hearing situation when noise of any kind interferes with the
audibility of another sound. Because of the potential difference in hearing capabilities of an
individual's two ears, it may be advisable to introduce a masking tone into one ear while testing
the hearing of the other ear. Id. at 17, 79-80.
115. The audiogram is a graph containing the results of the hearing examination, charted
according to intensity and frequency of the tones. Id. at 100-09.
116. For a discussion of the techniques of marking ear mold impressions, see BERCER, supra
note 2, at 98-107. For examples of potential malpractice liability resulting from the making of
ear mold impression, see Palmer v. Miller, 60 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Mo. 1945); Persten v.
Chesney, 212 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. App. 1948).
117. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-33-07 (Supp. 1977).
118. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 334.060 (Supp. 1976).
119. Asuz. REV. STAT. § 36-1924 (1974).
120. W. VA. CODE § 16-24-6(3) (Supp. 1976).
121. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 2007 (1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 743(c) (1971).
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tion testing. 122  Maine tests the applicant's knowledge of cros and
bi-cros fittings, knowledge of master hearing aid or sound pressure
measurement, and knowledge of relevant consumer laws.
123
The Oklahoma statute provides that the written exam shall follow
the guidelines of the exams of the National Hearing Aid Society.
1 24
Michigan has the only statute which provides that the written exam
given by the state board may be waived if the applicant has com-
pleted the home study course of the National Hearing Aid Soci-
ety.125  Particularly in light of the criticism of the simplicity of that
course, 126 such a waiver is not appropriate, for the State of Michigan
is delegating its regulatory powers to a private self-interest group
which may not have the same goals as the state.
Reciprocal and Grandfather Licenses
Most states allow licenses to be obtained through processes other
than the general examination procedure. First, some states provide
that a certificate or license of endorsement can be obtained based
upon a current valid license that has been issued by another state.
Those individuals who are licensed elsewhere may qualify for a cer-
tificate of endorsement if the issuing board concludes that the stan-
dards in the first state are substantially equal to its own standards. 1
27
The applicant then is entitled to practice his profession without taking
the exam. Some states require not only the same requirements in
each state, but also a clear policy of reciprocity between the two
122. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1708(b)(2)(b) (Supp. 1975). Speech audiometry, similar to pure
tone audiometry, determines the patient's threshold hearing level. But rather than hearing a
tone, the patient hears a list of two syllable words. Speech audiomery is also used to determine
the level at which speech is most comfortable, the level at which it is uncomfortably loud and the
ability to discriminate among sounds. NEWBY, supra note 15, at 120-34. See also DAVIS, supra
note 63, at 206-18.
123. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 1658-K(2) (Supp. 1976). Florida even attempts to test the
ability of the dealer to counsel the individual who will receive and use the hearing aid. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 468.127(3) (West 1977). See also W. VA. CODE § 16-24-6(3) (Supp. 1976). There is
a need for counseling because even when an aid is properly fitted, most new users of an aid go
through a period of adjustment as they begin hearing, with mechanical assistance, those sounds
that they have not heard for some time. In addition, various adjustments may have to be made
so that the user can receive optimum benefit from the aid. See How to Buy a Hearing Aid,
CONSUMER REPORTS 346, 349 (June 1976); E. CORLISS, HEARING AIDS 5-8 (1970); DAVIS,
supra note 63, at 312-16, 318-31.
124. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1562 (West Supp. 1976).
125. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1456(5) (1976).
126. STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 3-6. But see INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 3, at 212-14.
127. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1456 (1976); S.C. CODE § 40-25-100(2) (1977).
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states.' 28  Under the Kentucky statute, a valid license from another
state does not exempt one from the Kentucky examination, but
merely permits one to omit the training period of one hundred eighty
days in Kentucky. 129
The statutes do not always clarify the relationship between the cer-
tificate of endorsement and the requirement in some states of resi-
dency. The need for a certificate of endorsement applies not only to
the individuals who may move from one state to another, but also to
those who live near a state border and who may work in two states
while being a resident of only one. For example, the Florida certifi-
cate of endorsement apparently is limited to individuals who actually
move to Florida, not to individuals who may reside in another state
and wish to sell in Florida on an occasional basis.' 30
Second, approximately half of the states originally had a grandfather
clause providing that an individual with generally two or three
years131 experience at the time the statute was enacted would be
licensed without taking the exam. 1 32  As of 1975, almost half the
licensed dealers had been admitted under such provisions. 133 Fre-
quently these practitioners were admitted with minimal experience or
qualifications to serve the public in this fashion. 134 Other statutes
did not award licenses automatically. For example, the Mississippi
law merely gave a dealer with two years' experience at the time the
statute was enacted two years to pass the exam, whereas one without
that experience would have to pass the exam immediately. 13 5  How-
ever questionable such provisions were, their impact will decline
progressively as new dealers are licensed and as continuing education
is required.
128. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 84-5608 (1975). See also Op. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. M-1063
(1973), which permits a dealer to receive a Texas license by endorsement regardless of whether
the original license was obtained by examination, grandfather clause or reciprocity with a third
state.
129. Ky. REv. STAT. § 334.080(2) (Supp. 1976).
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.126(6) (West 1977). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-36-8(c)
(1974).
131. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 16-24-7(6) (Supp. 1976) (three years); S.C. CODE § 56-745.5
(Supp. 1975) (two years).
132. Individuals who had been performing administrative or executive functions in hearing
aid companies may have been "dealing" in aids, but may not have been "fitting" aids and
therefore could not be licensed under the grandfather provisions. 73 OP. KY. ATT'Y GEN. 672
(1973).
133. STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 6.
134. See STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 27-31. One permissible means of checking the qual-
ifications of a grandfather applicant was to require a list of ten customers to be furnished with
the application. 73 Op. KY. ATT'Y GEN. 623 (September 5, 1973).




REGULATIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF FITTING
AND DEALING IN HEARING AIDS
Continuing Education
After the applicant is licensed as a hearing aid dealer or fitter, he
generally may engage in the business for a one year period. The
applicant is then free from any future examinations or educational
requirements, except in those seven states which require continuing
education. North Dakota provides that before a license can be re-
newed there must be two days a year of continuing education, but
the statute does not place any requirements on the nature of that
continuing education. 136 The New Jersey and North Carolina hear-
ing aid committees are authorized to consider a requirement of con-
tinuing education, 137 while the Michigan statute requires in general
terms that an applicant shall furnish "satisfactory evidence that he has
studied current educational materials in the hearing aid field during
the previous year."138
Colorado, Iowa and Kansas have the most stringent laws. These
statutes provide that before an individual may have his license re-
newed, he must complete one of the following programs: a continuing
education program conducted by the board; a session conducted by
the National Hearing Aid Society which has been approved by the
board; or a session conducted by a hearing aid manufacturer which
has also been approved by the board. 139  In light of the frequent
developments in the hearing aid, medical and audiological profes-
sions, it seems only appropriate that all states adopt either by statute
or regulation the requirement of continuing education. Even admit-
ting that the benefit gained from some sessions may be minimal and
that the cost of training would be passed on to the consumer, such a
requirement should be viewed as an honest attempt to upgrade the
training of those individuals who are to protect and help the pub-
lic. 140
Sales Receipts
Virtually all the statutes require that a specific receipt be given to
individuals who purchase hearing aids. Typically, the statute requires
136. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-33-11 (Supp. 1977).
137. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9A-8 (West Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 930-3(c)(12) (Supp. 1977).
138. MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1457(2) (1976).
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-65-112 (Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 154A.16 (West Supp.
1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5821 (1972).
140. The National Hearing Aid Society now requires 10 hours of continuing education annu-




that anyone buying a hearing aid receive a receipt that describes the
name, address and license number of the dealer, the nature of the aid
and its condition, the guarantee provisions, and specific price infor-
mation.141 In addition, most statutes require that the receipt contain
specific language, in large type, that the buyer has been advised that
the seller gave no medical opinion or medical diagnosis. 142 A
number of states require the receipt to state that when the seller
initially contacted the buyer, he was advised that no medical opinion
would be given.143  Because of the danger that many potential users
may believe that a hearing aid dealer is a medical expert, the inclu-
sion of such warning language is appropriate.
The receipts are required to list the total price of the aid and any
down payment. North Carolina additionally requires the cost of the
hearing aids and the fees for testing and fitting services to be listed
separately. 144 Such a breakdown of the costs may discourage buyers
from seeking post-purchase adjustments, fitting or counselling if they
are charged separately for those services. On the other hand, those
individuals who do not need those particular services will not have to
pay for them, and others may seek them from a different source. 145
South Dakota, which like North Carolina requires specifically that the
buyer sign the receipt, also says that the signature shall constitute his
full "acknowledgement." 146 It is unclear what importance the South
Dakota legislature attaches to a receipt which was signed by the con-
sumer.
The most elaborate receipt provisions are found in Maine and Ken-
tucky. Maine requires that a receipt which is delivered prior to or at
sale include, in addition to the general information, the address of the
141. See, e.g., Aaiz. REV. STAT. § 36-1932 (1974).
142. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-65-117(2) (Supp. 1976); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. § 4566-1.14(c) (Vernon 1976).
143. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-49-3(b) (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 459,03(6) (West 1974).
For instance, the suggested purchase agreement prepared by the Kentucky board has the fol-
lowing language in large type at the top of the contract:
The purchaser has been advised at the outset of his relationship with the hearing
aid dealer that any examination or representation is not an examination, diagnosis or
prescription by a person licensed to practice medicine in this state and therefore
must not be regarded as medical opinion or advice.
See also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 784(9) (McKinney Supp. 1976) which requires the written
statement that "It]his aid will not restore normal hearing nor will it prevent further hearing
loss."
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93D-7 (Supp. 1975).
145. See ELDERLY, supra note 4, at 22-26, 66-68. The Federal Trade Commission has pro-
posed a partial "unbundling" of the costs involved in the purchase of a hearing aid. 40 Fed.
Reg. 26645 (1975).
146. S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 36-24-33 (1977).
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board of hearing aid dealers, the trade-in allowance, and the statutory
provision that the audiologist or a medical doctor may permit cancel-
lation of the sale if the dealer has provided an aid that is not advis-
able. 147 The Kentucky law requires a conspicuous statement on the
receipt that any complaints may be referred to the hearing aid board,
that the buyer has a thirty day right to cancel the contract for the
purchase, and that there has been no home visit without prior written
consent.' 48 Such comprehensive provisions are a necessary means of
protection.
Sales to Minors
Because of greater health, educational and cultural risks, twenty-
eight states have a specific statutory provision regulating the sale of
hearing aids to children. The definition of child generally includes
persons under sixteen years of age. 49 The statutes commonly pro-
vide that an aid shall not be sold to a child unless that child has been
examined by a physician within ninety days prior to the fitting of the
aid.' 50 If the child has not seen a physician within that ninety day
period, the statutes require that the dealer or dispenser shall recom-
mend in writing that a physical examination take place. The inherent
weakness in such a statute is that the child or his parents are still free
to ignore the recommendation and purchase the aid without ever
seeing a physician.
In order to overcome this avoidance of the recommendation, some
statutes bar the dealer from selling an aid unless a physician's hearing
test within ninety days has determined that there are no physical
deficiencies that would prohibit the effective use of a hearing aid. 151
Although this is an improvement over the recommendation provision,
this type of statute only requires the doctor to state that a hearing aid
would not be effective, without concluding that a hearing aid may
provide some benefit to the user. Some states further require that the
147. ME. REv. STAT. tit. 32, § 1658-C (Supp. 1976).
148. Ky. REv. STAT. § 334.030 (Supp. 1976). The Kentucky law also requires that the seller
disclose orally the condition of any used hearing aid prior to any signing of a receipt or contract.
149. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-65-117(3) (Supp. 1976); Onlo REv. CODE ANN. §
4747.09 (Page 1977). However, the statutes vary in their definition of the age under which a
person is considered a child. For example. the Alabama statute defines children as persons
under the age of ten, ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 150(23) (Supp. 1973), while the Washington statute
refers to children as being under age eighteen, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.35.110(2)(e)(ii)
(Supp. 1975).
150. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1556C (West Supp. 1976); W. VA CODE § 16-
24-14(a) (Supp. 1976).




child also be "cleared for a hearing aid" by that physician. 152 The
most stringent statutes bar the sale to a child unless that child has
been examined and has received a recommendation for an aid from a
physician.1 53 Finally, a handful of states prohibit a dealer from sell-
ing to anyone, regardless of age, until there has been a specific medi-
cal recommendation for a hearing aid. 154
The statutes commonly provide that the examination must be con-
ducted by a physician. However, a number of states require that the
examination be given by an ear-nose-throat specialist. 155 Mississippi
suggests that the exam be given by either a medical physician or an
audiologist, 156 in the process failing to distinguish the functions of
both professions. 157 On the other hand, Connecticut requires that
the child be examined and cleared for an aid by both an ear-nose-
throat specialist and an audiologist. 158 It is deemed unethical in
Washington to sell to a minor unless that individual has been
examined and cleared by an ear-nose-throat specialist in the past six
months who has not advised that the child go to a clinical audiologist
for an examination. 159 The statutes do make exceptions to the re-
quirement for an examination of a child if the dealer is merely re-
placing an identical aid fitted within the past two years, 160 if the par-
ents have "good cause," 161 or if the parents file a written objection
on religious grounds. 162
Acting under authority granted by the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act 163 and the Medical Device Amendments of 1976,164 the Commis-
sioner of the Food and Drug Administration has recently promulgated
federal regulations that significantly affect key aspects of the hearing
152. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-14(3)(g)(9) (Supp. 1977).
153. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3365.6 (West 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 154A.20
(West Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, 1658-D (Supp. 1976).
154. See text accompanying notes 206-214 infra.
155. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3365.6 (West 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 154A.20
(West Supp. 1977).
156. MISS. CODE ANN. § 7 3-14 -3(g)(9) (Supp. 1977).
157. The apparent antagonism between medical specialists and audiologists is revealed in a
series of articles in AUDECIBEL, the journal of the National Hearing Aid Society, Financially
Motivated Clinical Audiologists Open Attack on Otolaryngologists, Winter 1976, page 9; Spring
1976, page 74; Summer 1976, page 136. See also "ACO Sub-Committee on Hearing Aids Issues
Report," AUDECIBEL, Winter 1977, at 9.
158. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-404(a)(6) (West Supp. 1977); See also DEL. CODE tit. 16, §
2001(8)(m) (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-36-1(F) (1974).
159. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.35.110(2)(e)(ii) (Supp. 1977).
160. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 9 45:9A-25 (West Supp. 1977).
161. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 694.136(7) (1975).
162. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-65-117(4) (Supp. 1976).
163. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970).
164. Pub. L. No. 94-295.
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aid industry. 165 Effective August 25, 1977, the FDA now requires
that before a person under age eighteen may be sold an aid, the
minor must first be examined by a licensed physician.' 66  Unlike
some state statutes, the federal requirement cannot be waived for any
reason. However, the FDA requirement does not require that the
physician actually recommend a hearing aid. The physician must only
state that the patient may be "considered as a candidate for a hearing
aid." Another potentially troublesome provision states that the exami-
nation must have taken place only within the past six months, rather
than the past thirty or ninety days. Finally, the FDA does not re-
quire an examination by an otolaryngologist or a clinical audiologist,
even though both specialists generally are recommended. In a
specific notice to be given to all prospective hearing aid users, they
are advised that "a child with a hearing loss should be directed to an
audiologist for evaluation and rehabilitation since hearing loss may
cause problems in language development and the educational and so-
cial growth of a child." 167
It is uncertain how the new FDA regulations affect the state laws.
As originally proposed, the regulation would have permitted the
states to enact "more stringent requirements." 168 But the final reg-
ulation omits that provision. The Medical Device Amendments of
1976 provide for automatic federal pre-emption of inconsistent state
laws. However, state authorities still may petition the Commissioner
to exempt a state requirement if it is more stringent, or if it is neces-
sitated by "competing local conditions." 169  Therefore, states are free
to petition the FDA to permit a state requirement, for example, that
a minor be examined by an otolaryngologist or an audiologist or that a
physician specifically recommend a hearing aid. Such petitions may
be necessary if minors with hearing problems are to be fully pro-
tected.
165. The regulations, both procedurally and substantively, were approved subsequently in
American Speech and Hearing Ass'n v. Califano, CCH Med. Devices Rep. 9 15,004; 15,007
(D.D.C. December 19, 1977). See also Levin v. Kennedy, CCH Med. Devices Rep. 15,006
(S.D. Fla. October 25, 1977) (equal protection challenge rejected).
166. 42 Fed. Reg. 9285, 9296 (1977)(to be codified in 21 C.F.R. 801.420(a)(2)).
167. Id. at 9295 (21 C.F.R. 801.420(c)(3)).
168. 41 Fed. Reg. 16755, 16763 (1976).
169. Section 521(b) of the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295. The
FDA has rejected one petition that raised the pre-emption issue. Med. Devices Rep. (CCH)
13,851; 17,161. Challenges to state statutes on the ground that the federal regulations pre-emp-
ted the area have been dismissed because the regulations had not been finally adopted. See
New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 145 N.J. Sup. 580, 368 A.2d 929 (Super.
Ct., App. Div. 1976); New York State Hearing Aid Society Inc. v. State of New York, Med.
Devices Rep. (CCH) 15,001 (E.D.N.Y., December 3, 1976).
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Medical Referral
The statutes of sixteen states require that if a hearing aid dealer
discovers specific medical conditions during the course of his exami-
nation, that dealer must refer the customer to a medical physician.
Medical conditions described by the statutes 170 include: (1) visible
congenital or traumatic deformity of the ear; 171 (2) a history of active
drainage from the ear in the past ninety days; (3) a history of rapidly
progressing hearing loss in the past ninety days; 172 (4) acute or
chronic dizziness; (5) unilateral hearing loss of recent onset in the past
ninety days; (6) significant air bone gap; 173 and (7) visible evidence of
cerumen accumulation or a foreign body in the ear canal. 174  These
170. See, e.g., CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE § 3365.5 (West 1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-65-
118 (Supp. 1976). In 1975, the National Hearing Aid Society adopted, as part of its Code of
Ethics, the "Guidelines of Medical Clearance." If the dealer, during the course of the examina-
tion, detects one of the seven conditions, the dealer "must urge the client to seek medical help.
If the client refuses, the fact should be noted on the waiver and signed by the client. In fact, it
is advised that if any of one of the seven criteria is observed, the client should not be fitted with
a hearing instrument." National Hearing Aid Society, Guidelines for Medical Clearance (1976).
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 4, at 201-04.
171. For a discussion of the medical significance of these conditions, see generally BOLES,
supra note 16, at 86-154; DEWEESE, supra note 108, at 299-339.
172. Hearing losses generally can be classified in two categories. Conductive losses are those
that can be traced to the outer or middle ear. The hearing difficulty results from the manner in
which sound is conducted to the analyzing system, not with the perception of sound as such. A
conductive loss, which may be caused by ear canal blockage, middle ear infection or
otosclerosis, a progressive softening and weakening of the ear bones, may be corrected by an-
tibiotics or, in some cases, by surgery. NEWBY, supra note 16, at 34-46. The vast majority of
hearing losses, perhaps as much as 95%, falls into the second category, that of sensori-neural
hearing losses. If the loss results from the pathology in the inner ear or in the nerves connect-
ing the inner ear with the brain, it may have been caused by heredity, a prenatal illness,
childhood disease, long exposure to loud noises, or the aging process. Unlike conductive im-
pairments, a sensori-neural loss generally cannot be helped through treatment or surgery. Once
the nerves transmitting the sounds have been destroyed, they cannot be recreated or regener-
ated. Id. at 46-56. See also DEWEESE, supra note 108, at 340-61; DAVIS, supra note 63, at
88-136. Hearing aids are most effective for persons with a conductive loss, for the hearing aid is
simply required to amplify the sound. On the other hand, a sensori-neural loss, often includes
difficulty with particular sounds or frequencies. A hearing aid, while potentially of assistance to
many individuals, is not as effective with this second type of loss. Most of the recent technologi-
cal developments have been toward producing aids that do permit a response for different
frequencies. See DEWEESE, supra note 108, at 275-76, 278; DAVIS, supra note 63, at 100-01;
BOLES, supra note 16, at 164; INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 3, at 219-20.
173. The air-bone gap is the difference in decibels between the hearing threshold levels as
determined by air conduction and bone conduction tests. Id. at 500. See also the specific defini-
tion of OR. REV. STAT. § 694.136(6)() (1975). Compare ARiz. REV. STAT. § 63-1901(7)(t) (1975)
and FLA. STAT. ANN. 468.135(5) (West Supp. 1977) (medical referral limited to this sixth
condition).
174. An accumulation of cerumen, or wax, in the ear canal may prevent sound from reaching
the ossicilar bones of the middle ear. The removal of the excess by a physician may improve
hearing substantially without need for any mechanical assistance. NEWBY, supra note 15, at 20,
36. See also DEWEESE, supra note 108, at 303-04.
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conditions suggest that the hearing difficulties may be corrected by
medicine or surgery and in such instances an aid may be unneces-
sary. The medical conditions actually may be aggravated in some in-
stances by the presence of an artificial object in the ear and such
conditions may be indicators of substantial medical problems uncon-
nected with hearing difficulties.' 75
Some of the sixteen states merely provide that if the medical condi-
tion exists, the dealer has a responsibility to recommend to the cus-
tomer that it is in his best interest to see a physician before seeking a
hearing aid.' 76 However, the customer is still free to ignore that
advice and to purchase i hearing aid without seeking a medical opin-
ion. The state of Washington says that a customer must be notified in
writing of the need to see an ear-nose-throat specialist and that the
dealer shall not discourage the buyer from going to such a
specialist. 177 New Jersey provides further that after the dealer has
told the prospective buyer to see a physician, preferably an otologist,
the buyer must sign a receipt saying that he has received such ad-
vice, and the dealer must provide the buyer with the names of three
doctors qualified to examine him. 178  Maine l79 and Minnesota180
have the toughest requirements, providing that if the medical condi-
tions have been detected, the dealer shall delay fitting a hearing aid
until he has consulted a physician or an audiologist. While these two
statutes do make referral mandatory, their significance is diminished
by permitting examination by an audiologist, who lacks extensive
medical training.
The new regulations of the FDA also seek to promulgate referral
guidelines. The new regulations state that if the hearing aid dispenser
discovers any one of eight otologic conditions, he should advise a
prospective hearing aid user to consult promptly with a licensed
physician (preferably an ear specialist) before dispensing a hearing
aid.' 8 ' However, this regulation is weaker than both the originally
proposed requirement and some state requirements. As originally
proposed, the requirement stated that a seller "shall not allow a pros-
175. For a discussion of the possible medical and surgical procedures, see generally BOlES,
supra note 16, at 74-85; DAVIS, supra note 63, at 164-75; DEWEESE, supra note 108, at 348-60.
176. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1556(D) (West Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE §
16-24-14(b) (Supp. 1976).
177. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.35.110(2)(e)(i) (Supp. 1977).
178. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9A-24 (West Supp. 1977).
179. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 1658-D(2) (Supp. 1976).
180. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.55(1) (West Supp. 1976).
181. The eighth condition is pain or discomfort in the ear. 42 Fed. Reg. 9285, 9295 (1977) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. 801.420(c)(2)). But see INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 3, at 79-80 (hear-
ing aid dealers are unqualified even to detect these eight conditions).
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pective user to waive the medical evaluation requirement" if any of
the conditions were revealed.'8 2 The FDA ultimately changed the
specific conditions of the medical evaluation from "shall not allow" a
waiver to "should advise" consultation with a doctor.18 3
In its concern with those few individuals who may object to seeing
a physician on medical, financial or personal freedom grounds, the
FDA may be providing insufficient protection to those suffering from
one of the eight conditions who elect to ignore the dealer's "advice"
to consult a doctor before buying an aid. Although the FDA-man-
dated language informs the user that "the exercise of such a waiver is
not in your best interest and its use is strongly discouraged," and the
FDA further expects that hearing aid dispensers will be "conscien-
tious in impressing the importance of a medical examination upon
prospective users exhibiting any of these symptoms,"184 it would
have been more beneficial to the public interest to require referral to
a physician in these instances, thus limiting the opportunity for a
waiver in light of the medical risks present.
Door-to-Door Sales
Door-to-door canvassing in order to sell hearing aids particularly
has been attacked for taking advantage of homebound and elderly in-
dividuals who are unable to shop for reasonably priced aids and who
may be more susceptible to sales presentations. Therefore, six hear-
ing aid statutes place specific restrictions on door-to-door selling.
Delaware simply has incorporated by reference its basic home solici-
tation statute.'8 5 The Rhode Island statute, like most general solici-
tation statutes, gives the hearing aid buyer a right to cancel the
purchase within three days if the sale was consummated at a place
other than at the seller's business address. l86
The other four states are more restrictive. New York bars any
door-to-door canvassing for the purpose of selling or renting hearing
aids without the prior request of the customer. 187 Similarly, Michi-
gan bars canvassing house-to-house without a prior request or refer-
ral,' but the language of the statute suggests that a third party,
182. 41 Fed. Reg. 16755, 16763 (1976).
183. 42 Fed. Reg. 9285, 9288, 9291 (1977).
184. Id. at 9291, 9295.
185. DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 2020 (1975).
186. R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-49-3(C) (1976).
187. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 784(2) (McKinney Supp. 1976). A similar New Jersey regulation
was upheld in New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 145 N.J. Sup. 580, 368
A.2d 929 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1976).
188. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 338.1461(0) (1976).
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even if interested, could refer a dealer to a prospective customer.
The Kentucky statute requires written consent prior to a visit. The
consent must indicate that the customer is aware that the dealer may
attempt to sell a hearing aid during that visit.1 8 9 Hawaii takes the
simplest approach and bans any door-to-door solicitation for the pur-
pose of selling aids. 190 Unfortunately, these statutes do not clarify
whether the customer's response to dealers' and manufacturers' ad-
vertising may suffice as effective consent.
The Federal Trade Commission previously has dealt with door-to-
door sales by requiring on an individual basis that advertisements de-
signed to produce "leads" include a warning that a salesman might
call on those individuals who responded to the advertisements. 191
However, the FTC recently has proposed a significantly broader pro-
vision similar to that of Kentucky. If the regulation is adopted, no
seller will be able to visit the home of a potential buyer for the pur-
pose of inducing a sale unless the customer previously has given ex-
press written consent to the visit. 192 Therefore, the consent would
have to state clearly and conspicuously that the potential buyer is
aware that the seller may attempt to sell a hearing aid during the
visit. The proposed regulation does not clarify whether an effective
consent could be contained in the advertising forms that are to be
returned to the dealer or manufacturer.
It is questionable whether such regulations are helpful. Even the
most naive buyer is unlikely to believe that individuals go door-to-
door discussing hearing aids without a profit motive. Yet perhaps
such a restriction does help to distinguish more clearly the profit-
oriented hearing aid dealer from clinics or institutes that provide
hearing services.
Right of Rescission
In contrast with vision losses, hearing losses are more difficult to
diagnose and to correct. 193 In addition, a hearing aid will be worn in
a variety of listening situations, ranging from private conversations to
public meetings. The hearing aid that may appear effective and bene-
ficial in the dealer's office may turn out not to provide assistance in
the environment in which the user actually lives and works. There-
189. Ky. REv. STAT. § 334.030(2) (Supp. 1976).
190. HAW. REV. STAT. § 451A-14(b) (Supp. 1975).
191. 40 Fed. Reg. 26645, 26651 (1975).
192. Id. at 26648.
193. E. CORLiss, HEARING AIDS 5-6 (1970). See also NEWBY, supra note 15, at 329-34;
DAVIS, supra note 63, at 322, 327; ELDERLY, supra note 4, at 57, 204.
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fore, the idea of a trial period before the purchase of a hearing aid
has been advocated. 194
Seven state statutes have provided the hearing aid purchaser with a
variation on a money-back guarantee.' 9 5 North Carolina simply gives
the board the duty to establish regulations guaranteeing a full refund
to the buyer when an ear-nose-throat specialist provides a written
opinion that the buyer's hearing cannot be improved by an aid. 196
However, this statutory language may make it difficult for the buyer
to obtain a written opinion from an ear-nose-throat specialist, par-
ticularly when the physician may have limited knowledge of the
capabilities of hearing aids and when the buyer may have limited
access to the specialist.
The state of Washington similarly provides that the buyer has a
right to rescind within thirty days of purchase, based upon a medical
opinion recommending against the use of an aid. 197 A time limit is
included, a written opinion is not required, and the medical opinion
need not specifically state that a hearing aid cannot improve the
buyer's hearing. The Oregon statute provides that the buyer may re-
scind within forty-five days by giving a written notice to rescind.' 98
Rescission may occur in Oregon if a medical doctor advises in writing
against a hearing aid, if the seller has committed any unethical acts,
or if the seller failed to provide a written statement prior to consum-
mation of the sale as required by the statute. The written statement
must include the basic receipt information, the address of the health
department and the procedure for making a complaint, and general
advice to consult a doctor. In case of rescission, the Oregon dealer is
entitled to retain ten percent of the purchase price as reasonable ren-
tal for the thirty day period as well as the cost of the ear molds.
The remaining four statutes do not condition the right to rescind
upon a medical opinion. Vermont simply provides that any sales con-
tract shall include a thirty-day money-back guarantee. If the aid is not
satisfactory, the purchaser may return the hearing aid in new condi-
tion and shall be entitled to receive the full product price, less the
194. INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 3, at 71-74. The National Hearing Aid Society recently has
required its members to adopt a rental/purchase option plan for all hearing aids to ensure a trial
period. Id. at 203-04.
195. For cases discussing the buyer's right to rescind, on other theories, see Hagedorn v.
Taggart, 114 A.2d 430 (D.C. 1955); Hagedorn v. Leroy, 104 A.2d 606 (D.C. 1954); Buchanan v.
Dugan, 82 A.2d 911 (D.C. 1951).
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93D-3(c)(11) (1975).
197. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.35.190(3) (Supp. 1977).
198. OR. REV. STAT. § 694.042 (1975).
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cost of ear molds and any service provided.199 If the aid is returned
undamaged, the dealer may sell it as a new aid to a second purchaser
if its previous use is disclosed. The New York law, which also pro-
vides a thirty-day money-back guarantee, permits the dealer to retain
the lesser of ten percent of the purchase price or thirty dollars, in
addition to the specific cost for ear molds.200 That cancellation
charge also is adjusted annually for inflation according to the con-
sumer price index. The returned aid may be resold as new only if it
is reconditioned by the manufacturer, meets all the acoustical stan-
dards, and is warranted as a new hearing aid. Like the other rescis-
sion statutes, the New York provision supplements other remedies.
Specifically, the purchaser retains rights to recover the full amount
paid and any damages sustained for a breach of warranty of fitness for
use.
Kentucky applies several significant variations to the money-back
guarantee. The buyer's right to cancel for any reason must be
explained in large type on the purchase receipt. The cancellation
charge consists of fifteen dollars, the charge for any customer ear
molds or batteries, and five percent of the remainder of the purchase
price. The right to cancel does not apply to a hearing aid sold pur-
suant to a specific written recommendation by a physician or au-
diologist. 20 1
Maine provides for the most unique cancellation provisions. The
statute provides that at the time of the sale the seller may receive
only fifty percent of the purchase price. From twenty to thirty-five
days later, the seller is to make personal contact with the buyer and
provide all necessary services such as repairs or an additional fitting
of the aid. The buyer must be notified of his right to cancel. If during
this period the buyer expresses his satisfaction with the hearing aid in
writing, the balance of the purchase price is then due. However,
during this trial period, the buyer may cancel the transaction for any
reason by notifying the seller in writing. If the buyer does cancel the
purchase, the dealer is entitled to ten percent of the purchase price
plus the cost of the ear molds. 20 2
The Federal Trade Commission proposal on hearing aids builds
upon the four statutes which do not premise rescission on a medical
199. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4583(b) (Supp. 1977).
200. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 784(4) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
201. Ky. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 334.210 (Supp. 1976). The Kentucky statute provides for a
thirty-day money-back guarantee.
202. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 1658-B (Supp. 1976). In addition to the trial period cancella-
tion, Maine also permits cancellation of the sale for medical reasons. Id. § 1658-C(4)(D).
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opinion. Under the proposals, the buyer would be notified at the
time of the purchase of his right to cancel the sale within thirty
days.2 0 3 Cancellation would occur by returning a cancellation notice
to the buyer, without the need to state a medical or other reason for
cancellation. If the sale is cancelled and the aid returned in relatively
the same condition, the dealer would be required to return any old
aid used as a trade-in, cancel any financial obligations incurred by the
buyer and return any payments made. However, the seller would
retain cancellation charges consisting of the cost of batteries and ear
molds, and a thirty day rental fee, equal under one option to ten
percent of the purchase price with a maximum of thirty dollars ad-
justed annually for inflation.
The proposed regulation should be refined before it is promul-
gated. While the thirty-day period is a reasonable time in which to
test a hearing aid in a variety of situations, the cancellation charge
should be simplified. A rental fee of ten percent of the purchase
price, with perhaps eight percent on the amount of the purchase
price over five hundred dollars, should sufficiently compensate the
dealer for testing, fitting and counseling the user. Such a fee would
neither penalize the buyer nor encourage him to cancel the sale
whimsically.
The proposed regulation is not yet explicit in explaining what the
dealer may do with an aid that is returned. If the FTC follows the
New York approach, the hearing aid could be reconditioned by the
manufacturer and then sold as new. However, the money from a can-
cellation fee may be insufficient to permit the dealer to recondition
the aid and also to compensate him fairly for his time and services. In
addition, the regulation as proposed requires the hearing aid dealer to
return an aid taken as a trade-in. In effect, the dealer must hold that
trade-in in his inventory for thirty days to see if the buyer exercises
his right to cancel. The regulation should be amended to permit the
dealer to refund the value of the used aid instead of the actual aid in
order to allow the dealer to do as he wishes with the used aid.
Under the proposed FTC rule, which is similar to the Kentucky
statute, the buyer would not have a right to cancel if the dealer
merely sells an aid that has been recommended specifically by a
physician or audiologist. Such a regulation is based on the assumption
that a hearing aid dealer may make a mistake in selecting an aid but a
physician or audiologist will not. But that assumption has flaws. Those
two professionals may know less about hearing aids than a dealer, and
203. 40 Fed. Reg. 26645, 26647-48 (1975).
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regardless of the profession, the fitting of hearing aids is not an exact
science. The right to cancel should apply to the sale of all aids, and
the regulation should pass the financial risk of cancellation to the per-
son prescribing or selecting the aid, regardless of whether he is an
audiologist, physician, or dealer.
These attempts at a money-back guarantee 20 4 are indeed unique
and not likely to be found in statutory. schemes regulating other oc-
cupations or professions. However, they can be justified not only on
the basis that persons buying hearing aids are more likely to be taken
advantage of and need special protection, but more importantly be-
cause hearing aids are a unique product the value of which to a par-
ticular individual may not be predictable, and therefore a reasonable
trial period outside the confines of the dealer's office is necessary.
Mandatory Medical Recommendation
Perhaps seventy-five percent of all hearing aid purchasers never
see a physician before purchasing an aid. 20 5 To reduce the possibil-
ity of dealers selling unnecessary or even harmful hearing aids, six
states require that before a hearing aid can be sold, the medical
physician must provide a written statement of authorization or rec-
ommendation. 20 6 Of these six states, three have traditional licensing
statutes, one has a limited and simplified licensing statute, and the
other two do not license dealers at all. Hawaii simply bars the dealer
from selling a hearing aid without first obtaining a physician's written
authorization based upon a medical examination within the last ninety
days which has resulted in the doctor's prescription or approval of a
204. Even in states that do not require the right of rescission by statute many dealers are
voluntarily offering such rights to purchasers. One Florida dealer includes in all sales:
30 Day Money Back Guarantee. If the buyer is not completely satisfied, the buyer
may return the hearing aid, with all accessories, to 's Hearing Aid
Center within 30 days after the hearing aid was delivered and fitted (that is, by
) and the buyer's money will be refunded, except for the cost of ear
molds and the cost of dispensing fee ( ), which includes the case history,
audiometric, test and evaluation. This guarantee does not apply if during the 30 day
period any damage to the hearing aid has resulted from accidental causes or negli-
gence; Specifically, corroded battery contacts, scratched or cracked cases, damage of
components resulting from exposure to excessive heat, immersion in liquid of any
kind, dropping on a hard surface or any other damage not caused primarily by
defective parts.
205. ELDERLY, supra note 4, at 6-7, 348-49.
206. In 1975 the National Hearing Aid Society adopted a variation of the mandatory medical
recommendation. INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 3, at 201-04. In addition to weaknesses in the
guidelines, the policy is binding only on NHAS members and is limited by the enforcement
powers of a voluntary association. Maryland has recently adopted such a provision in 1977 MD.
LAwS ch. 735, 769.
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hearing device. 207 If the buyer is under the age of ten, the examina-
tion must be administered by an otolaryngologist. This requirement
may not apply to a subsequent purchase of another hearing aid.
Similarly, Pennsylvania bars the sale of a hearing aid unless a physi-
cian has made a written recommendation within the past six months
that the use of an aid "may be beneficial" to the customer.208
Kentucky, which has a traditional licensing statute similar to
Hawaii's, requires two written statements within the preceding ninety
days.2 09 A licensed physician must first approve of a hearing aid by
concluding that the patient has no ear diseases or other conditions
that might make the fitting and wearing of a hearing aid useless or
harmful. Next, a physician or audiologist must make a hearing evalua-
tion and recommend a hearing aid. That recommendation may in-
clude the make and model of a particular hearing aid or the approp-
riate hearing aid specifications. However, the strong consumer pro-
tection offered by the Kentucky and Pennsylvania statutes is under-
mined by permitting anyone over the age of eighteen to waive both
written statements.
New York, which has a modified licensing statute, provides that a
hearing aid shall not be sold unless within the previous six months
there has been a simple written recommendation for a hearing aid
from an ENT specialist or audiologist. 210 New York does not allow a
waiver. The only opportunities for waiver are religious objections to a
hearing aid examination or lack of an ENT specialist or audiologist in
the community. In this situation, a medical physician in general prac-
tice may give a simplified hearing test and make his recommenda-
tions. Although the examination and recommendation procedure of
New York is not as elaborate as that of Kentucky, 211 it does go
further in barring any connection between the physician and dealer.
Not only is the physician prevented from selling hearing aids for
profit in New York, but the physician also cannot refer, suggest or
207. HAW. REV. STAT. § 451A-14 (Supp. 1975).
208. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6700-403 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
209. Ky. REv. STAT. § 334.100 (Supp. 1976). Kentucky also prohibits the physician from
having any financial interest in the dealer's business. Thus, Kentucky prohibits an ear-nose-throat
specialist from hiring a licensed hearing aid dealer as an employee or locating that hearing aid
dealer in an adjoining office.
210. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 784(1) (McKinney Supp. 1976). Primarily because of its re-
quirement of a written recommendation by an otolaryngologist or a licensed clinical audiologist,
the New York statute was described as "impossible" by the dealers' association at the time of its
enactment. National Hearing Aid Society, Confidential Report (October 1975).
211. However, the New York law, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 781(g) (McKinney Supp. 1976),
permits a recommendation for a specific hearing aid.
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recommend a patient to a specific dealer. 212  On the other hand,
the physician may recommend or direct the patient to a professional
association or to a directory of dealers.
Vermont and Minnesota have enacted statutes which do not license
hearing aid dealers or fitters. Rather than promulgating an adminis-
trative licensing structure, Vermont simply bars anyone from selling a
hearing aid unless the potential customer has obtained a written
statement from a medical doctor based on an examination performed
in the preceding six months. 213 The language of the Vermont stat-
ute, however, is so broad that a dealer could sell a hearing aid even if
the doctor were indifferent to or actually opposed to the use of a
hearing aid. The ear examination is not required if the buyer objects
on religious grounds. However, the Vermont statute does state that
no physician or audiologist may sell hearing aids either directly or
indirectly for profit.
The Minnesota statute simply says that no one may sell a hearing
aid without the written recommendation or prescription of either an
audiologist or physician.2 14 The Minnesota statute does not state
clearly how specific the prescription must be. It is uncertain whether
the doctor must say only that a hearing aid would be of benefit to the
user or whether he must recommend specifically a particular hearing
aid model. If the doctor determines the particular performance levels,
then the hearing aid dealer becomes little more than a dispenser of
an item selected by someone else. The function of a hearing aid
dealer then would be limited to instructing the buyer in the use and
maintenance of the aid.
The Minnesota statute does not indicate when the recommendation
must be made by the doctor. The law permits anyone under the age
of sixty to waive these rights and purchase the aid without a recom-
mendation. 215 In order to waive the rights, the individual must re-
ceive a copy of the law in large print, and the law must be read aloud
to him. Like the Kentucky provision, this waiver is a broad exception
weakening the statute to the extent that it may not grant the protec-
tion intended.
In the most far-reaching aspect of the new federal regulations, the
FDA has followed the lead of the six states which require medical
212. Id. at § 785-a(1), (2).
213. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4582 (Supp. 1977).
214. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.32(2) (West Supp. 1976). The Minnesota statute was adopted
following an investigation of the hearing aid industry in Minnesota by a consumer group. See its
report, and the industry's response, in ELDERLY, supra note 4, at 243-51, 270-85.
215. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.44(2) (West Supp. 1976).
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authorization. The regulations provide that a dealer shall not sell a
hearing aid unless a physician has stated in writing that the patient's
hearing loss has been evaluated medically within the past six months
and that the patient "may be considered a candidate for a hearing
aid." 2 16 The regulation does not require an examination by an ear
specialist, as such physicians may not always be available in rural
areas. The regulation further waives an examination by an audiologist
because that type of testing would increase the cost of the aid and
would not provide assurance that the aid actually would benefit the
customer.2 17 Thus, the FDA regulation in effect repeals the weak-
ness of the New York and Minnesota approach in equating the physi-
cian and the audiologist.
As the federal regulations originally were proposed, the physician
would have been required to assert that there were no medical
reasons why the individual should not be fitted with a hearing
aid. 218 However, because of a concern that the doctor might be un-
willing to sign such a statement,2 19 the language subsequently was
altered so that the physician merely was required to state that his
patient is a candidate for a hearing, aid. Under the current regula-
tions, the doctor need not conclude that the candidate can be helped
by an aid, neither is he called upon to recommend or prescribe an
aid. 220  The rationale behind the provisions is that the hearing aid
dispenser, not the physician, should have knowledge of the perfor-
mance level of aids and select the aid most likely to provide assis-
tance. The FDA regulations permit the prospective user to waive the
medical evaluation. But before permitting the customer to sign a
waiver, the dispenser must inform the customer that the waiver is not
in the customer's best health interest, review the contents of a User
Instructional Brochure, give the customer an opportunity to read the
brochure, and not actively encourage him to waive the medical evalu-
ation. 221 The customer is free to waive the requirement of a manda-
tory medical evaluation for any reason.
The FDA regulations combine the best elements of the six state
statutes. While permitting the doctor to refer the customer to an au-
diologist, the relevant regulation does not equate an audiologist with
216. 42 Fed. Reg. 9285, 9296 (1976) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 801.421(a)(1)). See also 1977
MD. LAws ch. 735, 769.
217. Id. at 9288-89. The opposition of the audiologists to the regulation is also discussed in
Special Report, AUDECIBEL, 57 (Spring 1977).
218. 41 Fed. Reg. 16755, 16763 (1976).
219. 42 Fed. Reg. 9285-92 (1976).
220. Id. at 9288.
221. Id. at 9296 (21 C.F.R. 801.421(a)(2), (b)).
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a physician by permitting the former to make a medical evaluation.
While prescribing that the doctor must examine and consider the pa-
tient, it does not expect the doctor to be an expert in the mechanics
of hearing aids or in the subjective art of fitting a hearing aid and
counseling the user. While requiring a prerequisite medical evalua-
tion for all, it does permit the user to waive the evaluation. This
provision, combined with the medical referral in light of designated
otologic conditions, effectively balances the need to identify that small
percentage of users who may be helped by medicine or surgery,
while not unnecessarily increasing the cost or inconvenience to the
large majority who do not require medical treatment.
Miscellaneous Protections
A number of state statutes have other unique provisions designed
to protect purchasers and users of hearing aids. Several states have
provided that the audiometers used by dealers for testing shall be
calibrated periodically.2 2 2  For example, Florida provides that the
Department of Health shall set forth specific standards for testing
equipment, accessories and office facilities.22 3 Michigan requires that
a complete retail price list of all hearing aid models be available for
prospective clients.224 Vermont provides that the complete terms of
the sale must be disclosed in writing before the sale is consum-
mated. 225
A most significant consumer protection is now provided by the
User Instructional Booklet which is required by the FDA regulation.
The regulations would require that a booklet accompany each hearing
aid given to a prospective user. Further, this booklet would be orally
reviewed with each user before that individual waives the medical
222. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 346.095 (Vernon Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 459.085
(West 1974). By regulation, Arkansas has defined minimum requirements for an audiometer in
terms of frequencies, intensity, air conduction receivers and bone conductor oscillators, and
masking capabilities. Arkansas Board of Hearing Aid Dispensers, Rules and Regulations Article
XVI, Section 1 (1973). The suggestion has been made that audiometers be calibrated periodi-
cally by the board, rather than relying on the dealer to have a third party make necessary
adjustments. STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 9.
223. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.135 (West Supp. 1976). Since the results of a hearing test de-
pend in large part on the conditions under which it was given, see NEWBY, supra note 15, at
73, and the person who gives it, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
has recently adopted a regulation requiring all hearing tests to be given in a testing room
certified by the Department not to exceed specified sound pressure levels at specified frequen-
cies. See Reg. 1OD-48. § 28(2), effective January 1, 1977. However, the significance of this
requirement is undermined by the broad opportunity for a waiver given to the dealer and the
client.
224. MICH. ADMIN. CODE, § 338.1922, Rule 22(1) (Supp. 1970).
225. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4583(a) (Supp. 1977).
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evaluation, 226 a requirement that goes far beyond any state require-
ments. The thirteen specific types of information that would be given
include specific instructions on the use and maintenance of the hear-
ing aid, a description of known medical side effects to the use of a
hearing aid, the statement that the aid will not restore normal hear-
ing and must be used more than infrequently, the warning of the
eight otologic conditions, the requirement of a medical evaluation and
various technical data.227 To ensure that all information is made avail-
able fairly and effectively to the user, the FDA has required that
the User Instructional Booklet be approved prior to its distribu-
tion. 228 Even conceding that many users will not read the booklet
and that some dispensers may not be as thorough as the FDA envi-
sions in explaining the provisions, this requirement at least would
provide the hard of hearing with the warnings and information that
they have not always received.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATUTES
Unethical Acts
The acts prohibited by the statutes generally are described as
either unlawful or unethical. The unlawful provisions relate closely to
those adopted in other licensed occupations. The unlawful acts by a
dealer include selling or bartering a license, purchasing or procuring
a license by barter, altering a license, attempting to use an altered
license, and making a false statement on the original application or
renewal for a license. 229
The state statutes focus more significantly on the unethical acts.
These statutes customarily include a list of acts 230 that would be
banned in any regulated industry. Such conduct includes habitual in-
temperance, gross immorality, permitting another individual to use a
license, obtaining a fee by fraud, and employing an unregistered per-
son. Several states have enacted more specific provisions to deal with
226. 42 Fed. Reg. 9285, 9296 (1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 801.421 (b),(c)).
227. Id. at 9295. (21 C.F.R. 801.420(c)(1)).
228. Id. (21 C.F.R. 801.420(d)).
229. See, e.g., Am. REV. STAT. § 36-1936 (1974). Some states have supplemented this basic
list of unlawful acts. For example, Texas law provides that it is unlawful for a dealer to fail to
clearly disclose his name, business address and purpose in any telephone solicitation or to use
or purchase any customer list compiled by other parties. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4566-1.15(c) (1976).
230. See, e.g., Amuz. REV. STAT. § 36-1901(7) (1974). The South Dakota Board has the duty
to establish ethical standards beyond those listed in the statute. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 36-24-12 (Supp. 1976).
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the hearing aid industry. For instance, a majority of states consider it
unethical to sell a hearing aid to a child unless that child has been
examined by an ENT specialist and cleared for a hearing aid within
six months of the examination. 23 1  Indiana, on the other hand, states.
in its statute that it is unethical to sell a hearing aid to a person under
the age of sixteen or over the age of seventy unless an adult with
normal hearing is present when the sale is completed. 232  This ap-
proach, while uniquely providing some protection for the senior citi-
zen, fails to provide any medical protection for the child.
In addition to those states which have attempted to regulate im-
proper solicitation through door-to-door sales, 233 Idaho, for example,
prohibits the dispensing of hearing aids by mail in any form. 234 Mis-
souri takes a more limited approach by deeming it unethical to sell
bearing aids through the mail unless there has been a prior fitting
and testing by a licensed dealer.2 35 Therefore, Missouri would per-
mit a consumer to be tested and fitted in a hearing aid dealer's office
and then receive the hearing aid by mail without the dealer person-
ally delivering and fitting the aid. In light of the problems that may
arise in adjusting the aid and counseling the user, such an approach
ultimately may be impractical.
The legislatures have attempted to provide for a minimum quality
of treatment and service by the dealer in defining unethical acts. A
number of states simply declare it unethical to demonstrate gross in-
competence or negligence in fitting or selling an aid. 236  For exam-
ple, Colorado deems it an unethical practice to sell a hearing aid to
an individual without testing him, except where the sale involves a
replacement aid purchased within one year of the original pur-
chase. 237 California includes improper or unnecessary fitting of a
hearing aid in its definition of gross incompetence. 23s
There has long been a concern that hearing aid dealers have in-
creased their sales by suggesting that they possess some degree of
medical competency. Therefore, the statutes commonly view it as un-
231. See text accompanying notes 160-175 supra.
232. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-20-1-22(7) (Burns 1974); See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
37:2442(5)(v) (West 1974); MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-14(3)(g) (Supp. 1977).
233. See text accompanying notes 185-190 supra.
234. IDAHO CODE § 54-2913() (Supp. 1977). The FDA considered banning all mail order
sales, but concluded that such a prohibition was not necessary. Mail order sales must, however,
satisfy the requirements of the FDA regulation. 42 Fed. Reg. 9285, 9293 (1977).
235. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 346.110(1) (Vernon Supp. 1976).
236. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-65-114(g) (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. §
3 3 4.1 20(2)(g) (Supp. 1976).
237. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-65-114(1) (Supp. 1976)..
238. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3401(a) (West 1974).
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ethical for the dealer to make any medical analysis or prediction
about the effect of a hearing aid on a hearing impairment. 23 9
Louisiana forbids the dealer from suggesting that his competency is
based on a college education, 240 which would thus distinguish a
hearing aid dealer from an audiologist. Oklahoma, along with other
states, deems it unethical to use the term "clinical audiologist" im-
properly z.2 4  On the other hand, Mississippi permits the dealer to
note that he is a "Certified Hearing Aid Audiologist" if the dealer has
been so certified by the National Hearing Aid Society. 242
The problem of advertising hearing aids has troubled legislatures.
Following closely the regulations adopted by the Federal Trade
Commission in 1965,243 the states have passed general provisions for
controlling advertising and more specific provisions in regard to un-
ethical acts in the hearing industry. The states generally 244 have
adopted provisions deeming it unethical to use misleading or decep-
tive advertising,2 45 to use bait and switch tactics in advertising, 246 or
to use a false name in advertising. The Kentucky law declares it un-
ethical to advertise professional methods or professional superior-
239. DEL. CODE, tit. 16, § 2001(8)(h) (1975).
240. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2442(5)(S) (West 1974).
241. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1566(B)(3)() (West Supp. 1976).
242. MIss, CODE ANN. § 7 3 -14- 3 (g)(3 ) (Supp. 1977). It is very doubtful that the public is
aware of the distinction between an audiologist and a "Certified Hearing Aid Audiologist." See
note 13 supra. The dispute over the phrase "Certified Hearing Aid Audiologist" has occurred at
several levels. While some legislatures and the Attorney General of Idaho have permitted its
use, the Attorney Generals of Georgia and Kentucky have ruled that its use by a dealer is
improper. Compare AUDECIBEL 50 (Spring 1977) with Op. GA. ATT'Y GEN. (January 15, 1975)
and 75 Op. KY. ATr'y GEN. 454 (July 3, 1975). The American Speech and Hearing Association,
the organization of clinical audiologists, has petitioned the United States Patent Office to cancel
the registration of the trademark "Certified Hearing Aid Audiologist." National Hearing Aid
Society, Confidential Report (October 1975). See also ELDERLY, supra note 4, at 108-09.
243. 16 C.F.R. § 214 (1977). The proposed FTC regulation would in part supersede these
1965 regulations and would closely parallel the advertising regulations discussed in these two
paragraphs. 40 Fed. Reg. 26645 (1975). Two states have incorporated the FTC rules. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-4712(2)(c)(xii) (1971); TEX. STAT. ANN. § 4566-110(10) (1976).
244. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-65-114(c)(3), (c)(4), (e) (Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 45:9A-17(c)(3), (c)(4), (c)(10) (West Supp. 1977).
245. See also 16 C.F.R. § 214.1, .14, .15 (1977). The Texas Attorney General refused to de-
termine as a matter of law whether the use of a city name with the words "Hearing Aid
Center," such as "Austin Hearing Aid Center," was deceptive or misleading advertising, and
said it depended on the facts of a particular case and referred it to the Board. Op. TEX. Arr'Y
GEN. H-375 (Aug. 21, 1974). Cf. 16 C.F.R. § 214.11 (1977).
246. See also the specific criteria of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.130 (West, 1977); 16 C.F.R. §




ity.247 A California statute has prohibited the advertising of prices
for hearing aids.24 8
In Florida, it is considered unethical for a dealer to suggest falsely
that a hearing aid is a new invention, 249 that a hearing aid consists of
"nothing in the ear," or that a hearing aid is custom made. 250  It is
unethical in Louisiana to advertise that a hearing aid will restore or
preserve hearing or retard future hearing loss.251 Kentucky perhaps
goes the furthest by forbidding the sale of any hearing aid that does
not have the approval of the board of hearing aid distributors as to
reasonable merchantibility and workmanship.252 It is not clear from
the statute on what basis the Kentucky board would make such a
determination, but perhaps the board could rely on the tests per-
formed by the Veterans Administration.25 3
The unethical conduct provisions also deal with relationships be-
tween competitors. For example, in Arizona it is considered unethical
to defame competitors, display competitive products in a way that
disparages the products, falsely represent that competitors are unreli-
able, quote incorrect prices of competitive models, imitate or simu-
late trademarks in such a way as to deceive, use trademarks so as to
substitute one product for another, or use competitive information
through bribery or falsity. 254
To insure that there are no kickbacks or payoffs in the hearing aid
industry, the statutes customarily include provisions which deem it
unethical to offer money to induce one to obtain purchasers. 255
Thus, it usually will be considered unethical for the hearing aid
dealer to have a financial relationship with audiologists or physicians. It
is considered unethical in Arizona to share profits with another indi-
247. Ky. REv. STAT. § 334.120(2)(h) (Supp. 1976).
248. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 651.4 (West 1974). But see Virginia State Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
249. The statutes obviously do not bar true presentation of technological developments, as to
which see ELDERLY, supra note 4, at 42-45, 49-52.
250. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.139(9), (10), (14) (West Supp. 1977). See also IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 154A.24(n)-(q) (West Supp. 1977); 16 C.F.R. 214.7, .9 (1977).
251. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3 7:2442(5)(u) (West 1974). A Customs Court judge has even
taken judicial notice that hearing aids do not cure deafness: See J.E. Bernard & Co. v. United
States, 262 F. Supp. 434 (Cust. Ct. 1967).
252. Ky. REV. STAT. § 334.130(6) (Supp. 1976).
253. For an account of the struggle to obtain the VA test results under the Freedom of
Information Act, see Consumer's Union v. Veterans' Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). See also CONSUMER
REPORTS 192-93 (April 1971); BERGER, supra note 2, at 133-34.
254. Amz. REV. STAT. § 36-1901(7)(i) to (in), (p) (1974). See also S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 36-24-39(9) to (16) (1972); 16 C.F.R. § 214.16- .18 (1977).
255. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 150(32)(B)(3)(j) (Supp. 1974).
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vidual who aids in solicitation.2 5 6  New York deems it unethical con-
duct to grossly overcharge. 257 Tennessee's provision barring the
sharing of profits with an individual who is not licensed 258 raises the
question of a licensee who is employed by a corporation and who is
paid a salary, for example a dealer who works for a department store.
Certainly the provision permitting the corporation to hire the dealer
also should be interpreted to permit the corporation to share profits
with that dealer.
Finally, many of the statutes have unique provisions concerning
unethical acts. The Alabama statute declares it unethical to improp-
erly imply a relationship with a manufacturer.2 5 9 A California dealer
may not sell hearing aids without maintaining an established business
address regularly and routinely open for service to clients. 260 Most
states view it as unethical, if not illegal, for the dealer to practice
while having a contagious or infectious disease. 26x It is considered
unethical for a Florida dealer to fail to properly accept responsibility
for a trainee. 262 The Texas law deems it unethical not to engage
actively in fitting and dispensing for three years. 263  Taken as a
whole, the list of unethical acts is comprehensive, but unfortunately
the majority of states merely have incorporated general ethical provi-
sions which do not reach the abuses in the hearing aid industry.
Either by regulation or statute, the majority of states need to follow
the lead of Arizona, Florida, Kentucky and similar states which have
chosen to regulate unethical practices closely.
The Disciplinary Mechanism
A number of states have provided simply that the hearing aid stat-
utes shall be enforced, as with similar boards or agencies, under a
uniform licensing enforcement provision.26 4 Statutes that do have
their own enforcement provisions customarily provide that a written
256. Amuz. REV. STAT. § 36-1901(7)(r) (1974).
257. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw 783(i)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1976). On the controversial subject of
hearing aid prices, see ELDERLY, supra note 4, at 23-26, 66-68.
258. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1502(5)(r) (1976).
259. ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 150(32)(B)(3)(i) (Supp. 1974).
260. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3429 (West 1974).
261. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 84-5616(I) (1975).
262. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.130(8) (West Supp. 1976).
263. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4566-1.10(24) (Vernon 1976). This approach is less
effective than the approach taken in states which require proof of continued professional educa-
tion before a license is renewed.
264. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1566(A) (West Supp. 1976).
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complaint must be filed within one year of the alleged improper
act. 265
After the complaint is filed, prosecution and investigation in some
states is handled by the independent board of hearing aid dealers. 266
If the board itself handles the disciplinary procedure, there is the
danger that the accused dealer may be faced with institutional bias.
On the other hand, there is also the danger that the board may be
lenient toward its own professionals and overlook ethical viola-
tions. 267 In some states, the board of hearing aid dealers makes the
initial investigation, but the actual prosecution is pursued by the state
board of health. 268  In other states, the entire prosecution is handled
by the state board of health. 269 Finally, several state statutes provide
that enforcement shall be carried out by the local prosecuting attor-
ney or by the state attorney general. 270 Regardless of which author-
ity ultimately prosecutes the case, the hearing customarily honors the
rights to confrontation, production of witnesses and use of depositions
and subpoenas. 271 An individual who receives an adverse administra-
tive ruling may appeal to a judicial body for review.
There could be a risk in allowing a number of different agencies to
become involved. For example, if the board of health issues licenses,
but the attorney general has the authority to enforce the act, a lack of
cooperation between agencies may hamper enforcement and prevent
consistency in the law. In addition, there is certainly an advantage in
taking enforcement out of the hands of a part-time board of hearing
aid dealers which is comprised in large part of other hearing aid deal-
ers. Enforcement is likely to be more effective if there are full-time
staff members and if the disciplinary procedures are well pub-
licized. 272
Despite the statutory procedure, the evidence of effective enforce-
ment is debatable, even in states with strong statutes. 273 From 1970
to 1974, 2,383 complaints were registered with the state boards. Most
265. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 2018 (1975).
266. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 451A-15 (Supp. 1975).
267. See MCCORMACK, supra note 48, at 1278-82.
268. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 25-20-1(16) to (20) (Burns 1974).
269. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 40-25-160 (1977).
270. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-33-01(1) (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 2461a
(Supp. 1977).
271. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. 451A-15, 16 (Supp. 1975); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
338.1462 (1976). On the constitutional and statutory requirements for license revocation, see
generally COOPER, supra note 84, at 144-51, 491-500.
272. STAFF STUDY, supra note 1, at 10.
273. The problems of enforcement in Kentucky are reviewed in STAFF STUDY, supra note 1,
at 27-34; INVESTICATIONS, supra note 3, at 118-27.
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of the complaints involved dealer incompetence, unethical practices
and breach of warranty claims. Only one hundred and twenty-six in-
dividuals had their licenses revoked or suspended and sixteen crimi-
nal prosecutions were initiated. 274
Effective enforcement can be threatened by the lack of governmen-
tal cooperation. For example, a dealer in Daytona Beach, Florida 275
had his license suspended for sixty days in July 1974, pursuant to a
consent order from the Florida Department of Health. In February,
1975, the Department permanently revoked his license for unethical
acts. But the following month a trial judge stayed revocation and
permitted the dealer to remain in business. The Department of
Health attempted an interlocutory appeal, which was rejected in July,
1975.276 On remand, a change of venue was granted which was then
ruled improper in May, 1976.277 During this period, the dealer con-
tinued to sell hearing aids, despite continued evidence of deceptive
and unfair trade practices and despite an action brought by the State's
Attorney under the Florida Consumer Protection Act.27 8
If such difficulties in consistent enforcement are widespread, then
even the strongest statutes will not protect the hard of hearing
adequately. Indeed, an unenforced strong statute may be more
damaging to the public than no statute at all, for in the latter instance
the customer does not even expect the help of the state.
Penalties
The penalties set forth in the statutes distinguish between unlawful
and unethical acts. For example, the South Dakota statute clearly
points out, as do most of the other statutes, that unethical conduct is
not the basis for criminal prosecution unless it is otherwise declared
unlawful. 279  Nearly all of the statutes hold unlawful acts to be mis-
demeanors,280 usually of the second degree, 281 which exact a fine
274. Id. at 60-61. See the industry's response in INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 3, at 205-09.
275. Florida is reputed to have one of the more effective and active enforcement agencies.
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 3, at 127-33.
276. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Waiters, 315 So.2d 494 (1st Dist.
Ct. App. Fla. 1975).
277. Walters v. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 332 So.2d 684 (1st
Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1976).
278. INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 3, at 48-53.
279. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 36-24-39 (1977).




ranging from $100 282 to $1,000 283 and imprisonment for ten days 2s4
to one year. 28 5
All of the statutes have provisions for suspension or revocation of a
hearing aid dealer's license. 28 6  Some states place a time limit on the
suspension, typically six months. 28 7 Approximately half of the states
give the hearing aid board or the state board of health the power to
seek injunctive relief288 against an illegal or unethical practice. Ken-
tucky provides that a statutory injunction may be granted even with-
out a showing that any person has been damaged or has sustained a
loss. 28 9 Delaware provides that the board may seek an injunction
even though it also seeks a fine or imprisonment. 290 In contrast to
the Delaware approach, South Dakota considers the injunction an al-
ternative to criminal proceedings. 291 This statutory approach fails to
provide for both the protection of the public in the future and the
punishment of the offender for past actions.
Nevada provides for additional penalties. The state statute provides
for a possible probationary period of up to six months and gives the
board the power to issue either public or private reprimands to a
dealer who violates the statute. 292 Only New Jersey specifically has
included the remedy of restitution. 293  It is unfortunate that the
legislatures have not granted more boards the power to seek injunc-
tive relief and damages for violations of the state acts.
CONCLUSION
As the preamble to the Florida statute 294 indicates, the purpose of
hearing aid statutes is to protect the hard of hearing. But many of the
282. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 40-25-190 (1977).
283. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 784(10) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
284. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1568 (West Supp. 1976).
285. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1464 (1976).
286. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-65-114 (Supp. 1976).
287. See, e.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 36-24-40 (1977).
288. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1716 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9A-20 (West
Supp. 1977).
289. KY. REV. STAT. § 334.990(2) (Supp. 1976).
290. DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 2017(b) (1975).
291. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 36-24-42 (1977). Under the South Dakota law, the Board
is barred from bringing criminal action when it seeks injunctive relief.
292. NEV. REV. STAT. § 637A.290 (1975). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93D-13(a) (1975)
(private reprimand).
293. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9A-19 (West Supp. 1977). Pennsylvania permits "any buyer" in-
jured by a violation of the act to recover treble damages and attorney's fees. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, § 6700-608 (Purdon Supp. 1977). But the buyer must initiate the action himself, rather than
have the board pursue it.
294. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.121 (West Supp. 1977).
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statutes do not accomplish that desired goal. Too many of the statutes
have the traditional flaws of regulatory agencies: a board dominated
by members of the industry, inadequate funding, gaps in the regula-
tory scheme, vague and general standards, and ineffective or nonexis-
tent enforcement. A handful of states, including Colorado, Florida,
Iowa, Kentucky and Maine, have amended the traditional approach
with specific provisions more appropriate to the problems. These
states have required continuing education, mandatory medical refer-
ral, unlimited right of rescission, and specific advertising restriction.
Yet the broad provisions of these statutes also must be enforced, and
the evidence on this count is not convincing.
To adopt the approach of Minnesota and New York, which require
medical approval and recommendation before a hearing aid is sold by
any individual, licensed or not, may be the easiest type of statute to
enforce. But it also might doom the hearing aid dealer's future occu-
pation. Despite some abuses and shortcomings, those 15,000 indi-
viduals have dispensed to more than three million Americans hearing
aids that provide assistance with their handicaps.
In adopting its August 1977 regulation, the FDA emphasized the
roles of all members of the hearing health team-the otolaryn-
gologist, the audiologist, the hearing aid dealer-in the task. 295 The
adoption of the federal regulations, combined with experience
under the various state approaches, should, over time, clarify the
roles of the professions and should provide more definite answers to
the goal of helping the hard of hearing.
295. 42. Fed. Reg. 9285, 9287 (1977).
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